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Abstract
This paper studies long-term contracts for experimentation in a principal-agent setting
with adverse selection about the agent’s ability (pre-contractual hidden information), dynamic
moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We show that profit maximiza-
tion by the principal generally leads to under-experimentation by an agent of low ability,
even though there would be no distortion in the absence of either adverse selection or moral
hazard. The structure of optimal contracts is shaped by a variety of considerations including
dynamic agency costs and the possibility of post-contractual hidden information about project
quality. We derive two explicit menus of contracts that can be used to implement the second-
best solution: “bonus contracts” and “clawback contracts”. Both feature history-contingent
dynamic streams of transfers.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the following contracting problem: a principal owns a project whose quality
— viability, profitability, or difficulty — is unknown. There is an agent who has the expertise to work on
or experiment with the project, but incurs a private cost in doing so. Both parties learn about the project’s
quality over time as a function of output, the agent’s sequence of effort, and the agent’s (persistent) ability
or skill. The expected benefit of effort at any time depends on these beliefs: if, at some point, beliefs about
the project’s quality are sufficiently pessimistic relative to the agent’s ability, it would be optimal to aban-
don the project altogether. Both the agent’s ability and his effort choice in any period are unobservable to
the principal, inducing both adverse selection and moral hazard.1
These features are relevant in many contractual environments. Perhaps the most obvious appli-
cation is the design of incentives within or across organizations for research and development. A related
application is the testing of a breakthrough product, e.g. investigating potential side effects of a new drug.
But there are other quite distinct applications: for example, a firm or other organization may hire a re-
cruiting agency to search for an external candidate for its CEO or president position. The agency’s ability
and effort combine with uncertain market conditions to determine when it is optimal to end the search
and just promote the best internal candidate. Similar themes arise in marketing or pricing applications
where firms use agents of heterogenous ability to experiment with advertising or pricing schemes in the
presence of uncertain demand.
Although dynamic moral hazard, adverse selection, and learning are essential features of such
agency relationships, there is virtually no existing theoretical work on contracting in such environments.
It bears emphasis that “learning” here refers not to updating about the agent’s ability over time, but rather
updating about the project’s quality; moreover, learning is private because it depends on the agent’s
ability and effort, both of which are the agent’s private information. The socially optimal level of effort is
history dependent, and private benefits are determined by a conjunction of hidden information, hidden
action, and the private belief about the state. Consequently, these are rich environments to contract in.
How well can a principal incentivize the agent? What is the nature of distortions, if any, that arise? What
are the qualitative properties of optimal incentive contracts?
Our main contribution is to provide answers to these questions in a simple and widely-used model
of experimentation, the so-called “exponential bandit” model, which we now overview.
Modeling framework. The project at hand may either be good or bad (a persistent state). Time is discrete,
and in each period, the agent can either exert effort (work) or not (shirk), a binary choice that is unobserv-
able to the principal. The agent incurs a constant private cost in each period that he exerts effort. If the
agent works in a period and the project is good, the project is successful in that period with some constant
1We use the term “adverse selection” synonymously with pre-contractual hidden information in a principal-
agent relationship.
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probability; if either the agent shirks or the project is bad, success cannot obtain in that period. Project
success is publicly observable and obviates the need for any further effort.2 The probability of success in
a period (conditional on the agent working and the project being good) depends on the agent’s persistent
ability, which, as usual, we refer to as his type. This is a binary variable — ability is either high or low
— that is the agent’s private information at the time of contracting. Project success yields a fixed social
surplus that is directly accrued by the principal. Both parties are risk neutral and discount the future at a
common rate.
Social optimum. Consider the first-best solution, i.e. when the agent’s ability and effort are observable.
The public belief that the project is good declines so long as effort has been exerted but success not ob-
tained. Since effort is costly, the social optimum is characterized by a stopping time for each agent type:
as a function of his ability, the agent keeps working (so long as he has failed to obtain a success in the
past) up until some point at which the project is permanently abandoned. It turns out that the optimal
stopping time is a non-monotonic function of the agent’s ability. The intuition stems from two counter-
vailing forces: on the one hand, for any given belief about the project’s quality, a higher-ability agent has
a greater marginal benefit of effort (since conditional on the project being good, he succeeds with a higher
probability); but at any point in time, a higher-ability agent is also more pessimistic about the project’s
quality (conditional on having exerted effort and failed in all prior periods) because a failure is more in-
formative about project quality when the agent’s ability is higher. Thus, depending on parameter values,
the optimal stopping time for a high-ability agent may be larger or smaller than that of a low-ability agent.
Agency issues. The contracting problem entails hidden information at the time of contracting (the agent’s
ability), dynamic hidden action (effort is costly for the agent and unobservable to the principal), and
private learning (both parties update over time about project quality and hence the benefits of effort, as a
function of their beliefs about ability and the history of effort). The principal’s goal is to maximize profits,
and to do so, she can commit ex-ante to a dynamic contract that specifies a sequence of transfers to the
agent as a function of the publicly observable history, viz. project success/failure. More precisely, since
there is hidden information at the time of contracting, the principal may offer the agent a menu of such
dynamic contracts from which the agent can choose one.
Let us highlight some of the agency considerations that arise. First, since the agent chooses effort
in a sequentially optimal fashion and there is moral hazard, a contract can induce the agent to choose
different effort profiles depending on his ability; this is a key distinguishing feature from canonical static
adverse selection problems. In particular, for an arbitrary contract, there is no analog of a “single-crossing
property” to determine the relationship between the optimal effort profiles for the two types. Second,
since the agent of either type is getting more pessimistic about the likelihood of project success as failures
mount (so long as he keeps exerting effort), the static incentive constraint for effort becomes more de-
manding over time. While this suggests that it may be optimal to provide increasing rewards for success
2Our analysis also applies if project success is privately observed by the agent but can be verifiably disclosed.
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over time, there is also a dynamic incentive constraint that the agent should not prefer to postpone current
effort to the future in order to benefit from a higher future reward for success. In other words, there can
be a dynamic agency cost: the presence of a future reward for success makes it less costly for the agent to
forego a present reward for success and hence harder to prevent the agent form shirking in the present.
Third, in addition to the pre-contractual hidden information about the agent’s ability, private learning
implies that there is also the possibility of post-contractual hidden information regarding beliefs about
project quality.3 In particular, the principal’s and the agent’s beliefs about project quality would diverge
whenever the agent deviates by either choosing a different contract from the menu than he is intended
to and/or by shirking when the principal expects him to work.4 All these elements come into play when
determining how to best incentivize the agent while minimizing his “information rent”. Accordingly, part
of this paper’s contribution is methodological.
Results. Consider first the case where the first-best stopping time for a high-ability agent is larger than
that of a low-ability agent. In an optimal menu of contracts, the principal screens the agent types by
offering two distinct contracts that satisfy the relevant self-selection or incentive compatibility constraints
for contract choice. Each type’s contract induces him to work for a sequence of consecutive periods (so
long as success has not been obtained) at which point the project is abandoned. Compared to the social
optimum, there is a distortion in the stopping time: while the high-ability type’s stopping time is efficient,
the low-ability type stops experimentation too early. This implies that it is not optimal to simply “sell the
project” to the agent, because doing so would always induce the socially optimal stopping time. While
this inefficiency result is reminiscent of the familiar “no distortion at the top but distortion below” in static
models of adverse selection, the logic is rather different because of the varied considerations described
above and elaborated on later. In particular, it is the conjunction of adverse selection and moral hazard
that drives our results; without either one, the principal would maximize profits without causing any
distortion from the first best.
We show how to implement the optimal solution in two different and economically interesting
ways: a menu of bonus contracts and a menu of clawback contracts. In a bonus contract, the agent pays the
principal an up-front fee and is then rewarded with a bonus that depends on when the project succeeds
(if ever). For the low type, we characterize explicitly the unique time-dependent bonus that is optimal:
it is increasing over time up until the second-best stopping time when it drops to zero, i.e. the contract
terminates. For the high type, we show that the principal has latitude among a set of optimal bonus
contracts.5 One way of interpreting bonus contracts is that the principal sells the project to the agent
3Post-contractual hidden information is sometimes referred to as “hidden knowledge” or “moral hazard with
hidden information” (e.g. Hart and Holmstro¨m, 1987).
4Of course, such deviations will not occur in an optimal menu of contracts; however, these off-path considera-
tions matter when determining what the optimal menu is.
5The reason for the asymmetry is that the low type’s bonus contract is uniquely pinned down by rent-
minimization considerations, unlike the high type’s contract. Naturally, the high type’s bonus contract cannot
be arbitrary either.
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at the outset for a specified price, but commits to buy back the project’s output (which obtains with a
success) at time-dated future prices, so long as output is obtained by a pre-specified date.
By contrast, in a clawback contract, the principal pays the agent an up-front amount, which can be
viewed as a pre-payment for future success. Then, in each period in which a success does not obtain, the
agent is required to pay the principal some time-dependent amount, up until either the project succeeds or
the contract terminates. We characterize the unique sequence of payments from the agent to the principal
that must be used in an optimal contract for the low-ability type: the payment sequence increases over
time with a jump at the termination date. We call this a “clawback contract” based on the idea that
clawbacks in practice involve recouping a payment already made to the agent (sometimes with added
penalties) when there is some, perhaps inconclusive, evidence of the agent’s negligence. The evidence in
our context is the lack of project success; it is important to note, however, that in equilibrium the agent
does not shirk prior to the contract’s termination date. As with bonus contracts, there are multiple optimal
clawback contracts that can be used for the high-ability type.
The case where the first-best stopping time for the high type is lower than that of the low type
proves to be more challenging methodologically, for reasons best postponed until later. We fully charac-
terize the solution here when there is no discounting. We find that the distortion (or lack thereof) in the
duration of experimentation for each type is qualitatively the same as above. Nevertheless, the consider-
ations driving the structure of optimal contracts have some important differences and implications.
Related literature. Broadly, this paper fits into the sizeable literature on dynamic moral hazard. Most con-
tributions that study long-term contracting abstract from adverse selection, but recent exceptions include
Sannikov (2007) and Gershkov and Perry (2012).6 These papers are not concerned with experimenta-
tion and their settings differ from ours in multiple ways. Private learning from experimentation is a key
feature of the economic environments we are interested in, and as we show, it is the conjunction of this
element with both adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard that is key to our results.7
A few authors have studied contracting for experimentation, but they address different issues
than we do.8 Manso (2011) studies a two-period model in which a principal must not only incentivize
6Earlier papers with adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard, such as Laffont and Tirole (1988), often focus
on the effects of short-term contracting. There is also a literature on dynamic contracting with adverse selection
and evolving types but without moral hazard or with only one-shot moral hazard, such as the early contribution of
Baron and Besanko (1984) or more recently, Battaglini (2005) and Boleslavsky and Said (2012).
7Demarzo and Sannikov (2011), He et al. (2012), and Prat and Jovanovic (2012) study private learning in moral-
hazard models following Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), but do not have adverse selection. Chassang (2011)
considers a rather general environment and develops an approach to find detail-free contracts that are not optimal
but instead guarantee some efficiency bounds so long as there is a long horizon and players are patient. Adverse
selection and dynamic moral hazard also naturally arise in insurance problems, as surveyed recently by Dionne
et al. (2012), but we are not aware of any related theoretical analysis on optimal dynamic contracts in this literature.
8Experimentation or “bandit” problems date back in economics to at least Rothschild (1974) and are surveyed
by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2008). While much of the early literature studied single-agent decision problems,
Bolton and Harris (1999) introduced a Brownian motion model with strategic interaction between multiple agents.
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an agent to work rather than shirk, but also to work on exploration of an uncertain technology rather
than exploitation of a known technology. The latter concern, which we do not feature, is essential to his
main insights; see also Klein (2012), and for a multiple-agent version, Ederer (2009). These papers do not
have adverse selection and hence their focus is quite different. Somewhat closer to our setting is Ho¨rner
and Samuleson (2012), who emphasize the dynamic agency cost mentioned earlier (see also Bhaskar,
2012; Mason and Va¨lima¨ki, 2011). Again, they do not have adverse selection. Motivated by venture
capital financing (cf. Bergemann and Hege, 1998, 2005), Ho¨rner and Samuelson examine a different aspect
of agency by assuming short-term contracting with limited liability, specifically that the agent’s effort
requires some fixed funding in each period and a spot contract specifies a profit-sharing arrangement.
In this respect, we are closer to Besanko et al. (2012), but their framework does not have moral hazard
and instead focuses on issues of ambiguity. Gerardi and Maestri (2012) analyze how an agent can be
incentivized to acquire and truthfully report information over time using payments that compare the
agent’s reports with the ex-post observed state of nature. By contrast, we assume that the state of nature
is never observed when experimentation is terminated.
Our model can also be interpreted as a problem of delegated sequential search, as in one of the
applications mentioned at the beginning of the introduction. Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) and Lewis (2011)
are recent contributions on this topic. The main difference is that, in our context, these papers assume
that the project’s quality is known and hence there is no learning about the likelihood of success (cf.
Subsection 6.2); moreover, they do not have adverse selection.
2 The Model
Environment. A principal needs to hire an agent to work on a project. The project’s quality — synony-
mous with the state of nature — may either be good or bad, a binary variable. Both parties are initially
uncertain about the project’s quality; the common prior on the project being good is β0 ∈ (0, 1). The
agent is privately informed about whether his ability is low or high, θ ∈ {L,H}, where θ = H represents
“high”. The principal’s prior on the agent’s ability being high is µ0 ∈ (0, 1). In each period, t ∈ {1, 2, . . .},
the agent can either exert effort (work) or not (shirk); this choice is never observed by the principal. Ex-
erting effort in any period costs the agent c > 0. If effort is exerted and the project is good, the project is
successful in that period with probability λθ; if either the agent shirks or the project is bad, success cannot
obtain in that period. Success is observable and once a project is successful, no further effort is needed.9
For better tractability, more recent papers that study games (rather than contracting) adopt the exponential bandit
framework, for example Keller et al. (2005), Strulovici (2010), Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011), and Garfagnini (2011).
Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2012) study a career-concerns problem in the tradition of Holmstro¨m (1999), but model the
agent’s effort as experimentation with an exponential bandit.
9Subsection 6.1 establishes that our results apply without change if success is privately observed by the agent
but can be verifiably disclosed.
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We assume 1 > λH > λL > 0. A success yields the principal a payoff normalized to 1; the agent does not
intrinsically care about project success. Both parties are risk neutral and have quasi-linear preferences,
share a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1], and are expected-utility maximizers.
Contracts. We consider contracting at period zero with full commitment power from the principal. Since
there is hidden information at the time of contracting, without loss of generality the principal’s problem
is to offer the agent a menu of dynamic contracts from which the agent chooses one. A dynamic contract
specifies a sequence of transfers as a function of the publicly observable history, which is simply whether
or not the project has been successful to date. To isolate the effects of adverse selection, we do not impose
any limited liability constraints (but see Subsection 6.4). We assume that once the agent has accepted
a contract, he is free to work or shirk in any period up until some termination date that is specified by
the contract.10 Throughout, we follow the convention that transfers are from the principal to the agent;
negative values represent payments in the other direction.
Formally, a contract is given byC = (T,W0, b, l), where T ∈ N ≡ {0, 1, . . .} is the termination date of
the contract, W0 ∈ R is an up-front transfer (or wage) at period zero, b = (b1, . . . , bT ) specifies a transfer
bt ∈ R conditional on the project being successful in period t, and analogously l = (l1, . . . , lT ) specifies a
transfer lt ∈ R conditional on the project not being successful in period t (nor in any prior period).11 We
refer to any bt as a bonus and any lt as a penalty; note, however, that bt is not constrained to be positive nor
must lt be negative, although these cases will be focal and hence our choice of terminology. Without loss
of generality, we assume that if T > 0 then T = max{t : either bt 6= 0 or lt 6= 0}. The agent’s actions are
denoted by a = (a1, . . . , aT ), where at = 1 if the agent works in period t and at = 0 if the agent shirks.
Payoffs. The principal’s expected discounted payoff at time zero from a contract C = (T,W0, b, l), an
agent of type θ, and a sequence of actions from the agent a is denoted Πθ0(C,a) and computed as follows:




















To interpret the above formula, note first that W0 is the up-front transfer made from the principal to
the agent. With probability 1 − β0 the state is bad, in which case the project never succeeds and hence
the entire sequence of penalties l is transferred. Conditional on the state being good (which occurs with
probability β0), the probability of project success depends on both the agent’s effort choices and his ability;
10There is no loss of generality here. If the principal has the ability to block the agent from choosing whether to
work in some period — “lock him out of the laboratory”, so to speak — this can just as well be achieved by instead
stipulating that project success in that period would trigger a large payment to the principal.
11We thus restrict attention to deterministic contracts. Throughout, symbols in bold typeface denote vectors. W0
and T are redundant because W0 can be effectively induced by suitable modifications to b1 and l1, while T can be
effectively induced by setting bt = lt = 0 for all t > T . However, it is expositionally convenient to include these
components explicitly in defining a contract. Furthermore, there is no loss in assuming that T ∈ N; as we show, it is







is the probability that a success does not obtain between period 1 and t − 1 conditional on
the good state. If the project were to succeed at time t, then the principal would earn a payoff of 1 in that
period, and the transfers would be the sequence of penalties (l1, . . . , lt−1) followed by the bonus bt.
Through analogous reasoning, bearing in mind that the agent does not directly value project suc-
cess but incurs the cost of effort, the agent’s expected discounted payoff at time zero given his type θ,
contract C, and action profile a is
U θ0 (C,a) := W0 + (1− β0)
T∑
t=1

















If a contract is not accepted, both parties’ payoffs are normalized to zero. Given any contract C,
it will be useful to denote αθ (C) := arg max
a
U θ0 (C,a) as the set of optimal action plans for the agent
of type θ under this contract. With a slight abuse of notation, we will write U θ0 (C,α
θ(C)) for the type-θ
agent’s indirect utility at time zero from any contract C.
3 Benchmarks
This section presents preliminaries concerning efficiency benchmarks and simple classes of contracts.
3.1 The first best
Consider the first-best solution, i.e. when the agent’s type θ is commonly known and his effort in each
period is commonly observable. Since beliefs about the project quality (i.e. the state being good) decline
so long as effort has been exerted but success not obtained, the first-best solution is characterized by a
stopping rule such that an agent of ability θ keeps exerting effort so long as success has not obtained up
until some period tθ, whereafter effort is no longer exerted. Let βθt be a generic belief on the state being
good at the beginning of period t (which will depend on the history of effort), and βθt be this belief when
















β0 (1− λθ)t−1 + (1− β0)
. (4)
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Note that (3) is only well-defined when c ≤ β0λθ; if c > β0λθ, it would be optimal to never
experiment, i.e. stop at tθ = 0. To focus on the most interesting cases, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. Experimentation is efficient for both types: for θ ∈ {L,H}, β0λθ > c.
In particular, the above assumption implies c < 1, where 1 is the social benefit from project suc-
cess. If parameter values are such that βθtθλθ = c,12 equations (3) and (4) can be combined to derive the
following closed-form solution for the optimal stopping time for type θ:








log (1− λθ) . (5)
Equation (5) yields intuitive monotonicity of the first-best stopping time as a function of the prior that
the project is good, β0, and the cost of effort, c.13 But it also implies a fundamental non-monotonicity
as a function of the agent’s ability, λθ, as shown in Figure 1.14 This stems from the interaction of two
countervailing forces. On the one hand, for any given belief about the state, the expected marginal benefit
of effort is higher when the agent’s ability is higher; on the other hand, the higher is the agent’s ability, the
more informative is a lack of success in a period in which he works. Hence, at any time t > 1, a higher-
ability agent is more pessimistic about the state (given that effort has been exerted in all prior periods),
which has the effect of decreasing the expected marginal benefit of effort. Altogether, this makes the first-
best stopping time non-monotonic in ability; both tH > tL and tH < tL are robust possibilities that arise
for different parameters. As we will see, this has substantial implications.















One class of canonical contracts is where aside from the initial transfer, any other transfer occurs only
when the agent obtains a success by the termination date:
Definition 1. A bonus contract is C = (T,W0, b, l) such that lt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. A bonus contract
is a constant-bonus contract if, in addition, there is some constant b such that bt = b for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
12We do not assume this condition in the main analysis, but it is convenient to use for the discussion that follows
in this subsection.
13One may also notice that the discount factor, δ, does not enter (5). In other words, unlike the traditional focus
of bandit models, there is no tradeoff here between “exploration” and “exploitation”, as the first-best strategy is
invariant to patience. Our model and subsequent analysis can be generalized to incorporate this tradeoff, but the
additional burden does not yield commensurate insight.
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t is belief on good state at beginning of t given work up to t
Assumption 1. Experimentation is e cient: for ✓ 2 {L,H},  0 ✓ > c.
Note both tH > tL and tH < tL are robust possibilities
! Productivity vs. learning e↵ects:
• For given belief on good state, marginal benefit of e↵ort higher for H
• But at any point in time, given no success, belief lower for H
Model – Environment (2)
In each period t 2 {1, 2, . . .}, agent covertly chooses to work or shirk
• Exerting e↵ort in any period costs the agent c > 0
If agent works and state is good, project succeeds with probability  ✓
• 1 >  H >  L > 0
If agent shirks or state is bad, success cannot obtain
Project success yields principal payo↵ normalized to 1
• No further e↵ort once success is obtained
Project success is publicly observable
• Results also hold if privately observed by agent but verifiable disclosure
Figure 1 – The first-best stopping time.
While a general bonus contr ct rewards the agent with a time-dependent bonus for success, a
constant-bonus contract pays the same reward independent of when success is obtained up until the
termination date. When the context is clear, we ease notation by denoting a bonus contract as just
C = (T,W0, b) and a constant-bonus contract as C = (T,W0, b).
Another kind of contract that will prove useful is where the agent receives no payments for suc-
cess, and instead is penalized for failure (i.e. lack of success). Such a contract will satisfy the agent’s
participation constraint only if he is paid some positive amount at time zero, which motivates the termi-
nology of “clawbacks”. Formally:
Definition 2. A clawback contract is C = (T,W0, b, l) such that bt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. A clawback
contract is a onetime-clawback contract if, in addition, lt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
Note that a clawback contract allows for |lt| > W0 in any t, i.e. clawbacks should be understood as
allowing for penalties larger than what the agent initially received from the principal at time zero. Unlike
bonus contracts, where at most one bonus is ever paid, a general clawback contract involves the possibility
of transfers in multiple periods after experimentation has begun; in particular, the agent may be penalized
for failure in every period from 1 to the termination date, T . However, in a onetime-clawback contract,
this is not the case because the agent makes only one payment aside from any initial transfer, which is
at time T (conditional on no success up to that point). When the context is clear, we ease notation by
denoting a clawback contract as just C = (T,W0, l) and a onetime-clawback contract as C = (T,W0, lT ).
As one might expect, there is an isomorphism between clawback contracts and bonus contracts;
furthermore, either class is “large enough” in a suitable sense. To make this notion precise, we introduce
the following definition.
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Definition 3. Two contracts, C = (T,W0, b, l) and Ĉ = (T, Ŵ0, b̂, l̂), are equivalent if for all θ ∈ {L,H} and
a = (a1, . . . , aT ): U θ0 (C,a) = U
θ
0 (Ĉ,a) and Π
θ
0 (C,a) = Π
θ
0(Ĉ,a).
In particular, for any given type of the agent, his set of optimal action plans is invariant across
equivalent contracts.
Proposition 1. For any contract,C = (T,W0, b, l), there exist both an equivalent clawback contract Ĉ = (T, Ŵ0, l̂)
and an equivalent bonus contract C˜ = (T, W˜0, b˜).
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that it is without loss to focus either on bonus contracts or on clawback con-
tracts. The proof is constructive: given an arbitrary contract, it explicitly derives equivalent clawback and
bonus contracts. The intuition is that all that matters in any contract is the induced vector of discounted
transfers for success occurring in each possible period (and never). The proof also shows that when δ = 1,
onetime-clawback contracts are equivalent to constant-bonus contracts.
3.3 No adverse selection or no moral hazard
Our model has two sources of asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. To see that
their interaction is essential, it is useful to understand what would happen in the absence of either one.
Consider first the case without adverse selection, i.e. assume the agent’s ability is observable but
there is moral hazard. Constant-bonus contracts are then optimal for the principal. To see this, suppose
the principal offers the agent of type θ a constant-bonus contract Cθ = (tθ,W θ0 , 1), where W
θ
0 is chosen so
that conditional on the agent exerting effort in each period up to the termination date (as long as success


















+W θ0 = 0,
where the notation 1 denotes the action profile of working in every period of the contract. This contract
effectively sells the project to the agent at a price that extracts all the surplus. Plainly, this achieves the
first-best level of experimentation and the principal cannot improve on this. Proposition 1 implies that
this optimum can also be implemented with clawback contracts; in fact, it can be shown that onetime-
clawback contracts suffice.
Consider next the case with adverse selection but without moral hazard: the agent’s effort in
any period still costs him c > 0 but is observable and contractible. Formally this amounts to ignoring
incentive compatibility constraints for effort. In this setting, the principal can use the two types’ differing
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probabilities of success to screen the agent without creating any distortions, crucially exploiting the fact
that under observable effort the agent can effectively be prohibited from adjusting his effort profile.15 To
be more specific, suppose the principal offers the agent a choice between two constant-bonus contracts,
both of which require the agent to work in every period until the termination date: CH = (tH ,WH0 , b
H)
and CL = (tL,WL0 , b
L), where bH > 0 > bL, and for each θ ∈ {L,H}, W θ is set so that U θ0 (Cθ,1) = 0, i.e.
type θ’s participation constraint binds in the contract Cθ. Notice that contract CH rewards the agent for
success because bH > 0 whereas CL punishes the agent for success because bL < 0. Under either contract,
type H is more likely to incur these transfers than type L, given that the agent must work in each period.
Consequently, by choosing the magnitudes of both bH and bL sufficiently large, one can ensure that type
L finds CH “too risky” to accept over CL whereas type H finds CL too risky to accept over CH . We
should emphasize that the bonuses in these contracts are not used to incentivize effort but are instead
solely an instrument to screen the agent. The mechanism is reminiscent of Cremer and McLean (1985)
because effectively the principal offers the agent a choice between two bets on whether success will be
obtained when effort is exerted in every period, and exploits the two types’ distinct success probabilities
to extract all the surplus by pricing the bets differently.
An analogous argument can also be used to implement the optimum with clawback contracts
rather than constant-bonus contracts, as predicted by Proposition 1; indeed, onetime-clawback contracts
again suffice. To summarize:
Theorem 1. If there is either no moral hazard or no adverse selection, the principal optimally implements the first
best and extracts all the surplus; either constant-bonus or onetime-clawback contracts can be used to achieve this.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
We further note that experimentation or learning about project quality is also important for our
results. In the absence of learning (i.e. if the project were known to be good, β0 = 1), the principal may
again implement the first best. For expositional purposes, we defer this discussion to Subsection 6.2.
4 Optimal Contracts when tH > tL
We develop our main results on optimal contracts for experimentation with both adverse selection and
moral hazard by first studying the case where the first-best stopping times are ordered tH > tL, i.e. when
the speed-of-learning effect that pushes the first-best stopping time down for a higher-ability agent does
not dominate the productivity effect that pushes in the other direction. We maintain this assumption
implicitly throughout the discussion in this section.
15For example, the principal can stipulate severe penalties if the agent does not use the desired effort profile.
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4.1 The solution
Without loss, we assume that the principal specifies a desired effort profile along with a contract. An opti-
mal menu of contracts maximizes the principal’s ex-ante expected profit subject to incentive compatibility
constraints for effort (ICθa below), participation constraints (IRθ below), and self-selection constraints for
the agent’s choice of contract (ICθ,θ
′













subject to, for all θ, θ′ ∈ {L,H},
aθ ∈ αθ(Cθ), (ICθa)
U θ0 (C
θ,aθ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
U θ0 (C







Adverse selection is reflected in the self-selection constraints (ICθ,θ
′
), as is familiar. Dynamic moral
hazard is reflected directly in the constraints (ICθa) and, importantly, also indirectly in the constraints
(ICθ,θ
′
) via the term αθ(Cθ
′
). To get a sense of how these matter, consider the problem of incentivizing
the agent to work in some period t. The agent’s incentive to work at t is shaped not only by period t
transfers (bt and lt) but also by the subsequent sequences of transfers through their effect on continuation
values. In particular, ceteris paribus, raising the continuation value (say, by increasing either bt+1 or lt+1)
makes reaching period t+ 1 more attractive and hence reduces the incentive to work in period t: this is a
dynamic agency effect. Note moreover that the continuation value at any point in a contract depends on
the agent’s type and his effort profile; hence it is not sufficient to simply work with a single continuation
value at each period. Furthermore, besides having an effect on continuation values, the agent’s type also
affects current incentives for effort because the expected marginal benefit of effort in any period differs
for the two types. Altogether, the optimal plan of action will generally be different for the two types of
the agent, i.e. for an arbitrary contract C, we may have αH(C) ∩αL(C) = ∅.16
Our result on second-best efficiency is as follows:
Theorem 2. Assume tH > tL. In any optimal menu of contracts, each type θ ∈ {L,H} is induced to work for
some number of periods, tθ; if δ < 1, the periods of work are 1, . . . , tθ.17 Relative to the first-best stopping times, tH
and tL, the second-best has tH = tH and tL ≤ tL.
Theorem 2 says that relative to the first best, there is no distortion in the stopping time of the high-
16Related issues arise in static models that allow for both adverse selection and moral hazard; see for example the
discussion in Laffont and Martimort (2001, Chapter 7.1).
17Generically, tθ is unique for each θ ∈ {L,H}. In the non-generic cases where multiple optima exist, we focus on
the highest optimum for each type.
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ability agent whereas the low-ability agent stops experimenting too early. It is interesting that this is a
familiar “no distortion (only) at the top” result from static models of adverse selection, even though the in-
efficiency arises here from the conjunction of adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard (cf. Theorem 1).
The reason is that only in the presence of moral hazard does the high type extract an “information rent”
here. As we will see subsequently, distorting the duration of experimentation from the low type allows the
principal to reduce this information rent. The optimal tL trades off this information rent with efficiency
or social surplus from the low type. For typical parameters, it will be the case that tL ∈ {1, . . . , tL − 1};
however, it is possible that the low type will be induced to not experiment at all (tL = 0) and it is also
possible to have no distortion in the low type’s stopping time (tL = tL). The former possibility arises for
reasons akin to exclusion in the standard model (e.g. the prior, µ0, on the high type is sufficiently high);
the latter possibility is because time is discrete. Indeed, if the length of each time interval shrinks and one
takes a suitable continuous-time limit, then there will be some distortion, i.e. tL < tL; a formal proof is
available from the authors on request.
Theorem 2 is established through a characterization of a class of optimal menus:
Theorem 3. Assume tH > tL. There is an optimal menu in which the principal separates the two types using
clawback contracts. In particular, the optimum can be implemented using a onetime-clawback contract for type H ,










1. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , tL},
lLt =












if t = tL;
(6)
2. WL0 > 0 is such that the participation constraint, (IR
L), binds;
3. Type H gets an information rent: UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) > 0;
4. 1 ∈ αH(CH); 1 ∈ αL(CL); and 1 = αH(CL).
Generically, the above contract is the unique optimal contract for type L within the class of clawback contracts.
Proof. See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
According to Theorem 3, the high type gets an information rent in any optimal menu of contracts.
The contract for the low type characterized by (6) is a clawback contract in which the penalty is increasing
in magnitude in each period t < tL at which the project does not succeed (since βLt > β
L
t+1), followed by a
larger penalty that “jumps” in the final period tL conditional on no success then. Figure 2 below depicts
this contract graphically; the comparative statics seen in the figure will be discussed subsequently. Only
when there is no discounting does the low type’s contract reduce to a onetime-clawback contract where
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a penalty is paid only if the project has not succeeded by tL. For any discount factor, the high type’s
contract characterized in Theorem 3 is a onetime-clawback contract in which he only pays a penalty to
the principal if there is no success by the first-best stopping time tH . On the equilibrium path, both types
exert effort in every period until their respective stopping times; moreover, were type H to take type
L’s contract (off the equilibrium path), he would also exert effort in every period of the contract. This
implies that type H gets an information rent because he would be less likely than type L to incur any of
the penalties in CL.
Although the optimal contract for type L is generically unique among clawback contracts, there
are a variety of optimal contracts for type H (even generically). The reason is that the low type’s optimal
contract is pinned down by the need to simultaneously incentivize the low type’s effort and yet minimize
the information rent obtained by the high type. This leads to a sequence of penalties for the low type,
given by (6), that make the low type indifferent between working and shirking in each period of the
contract, as we explain further in Subsection 4.2. On the other hand, the high type’s contract only needs
to be suitably designed to make it unattractive for the low type, subject to incentivizing effort from the
high type and delivering to him a utility level given by his information rent. There is latitude in how this
can be done: the high type’s onetime-clawback contract of Theorem 3 is chosen to make it “too risky” for
the low type, analogous to the logic used in Theorem 1.
Remark 1. Our proof of Theorem 3 provides a simple algorithm to solve for an optimal menu of contracts.
For any tˆ ∈ {0, . . . , tL}, we characterize an optimal menu that solves the principal’s program subject to
an additional constraint that the low type must experiment until period tˆ. The low type’s contract in this
menu is given by (6) with the termination date tˆ rather than tL. An optimal menu is then obtained by
maximizing the principal’s objective function over tˆ ∈ {0, . . . , tL}.
The characterization in Theorem 3 yields the following comparative statics:
Proposition 2. Assume tH > tL. The second-best stopping time for the low type, tL, is weakly increasing in β0
and weakly decreasing in both c and µ0.
Proof. See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
Figure 2 illustrates these comparative statics. The comparative static in µ0 is intuitive: the higher
the ex-ante probability of the high type, the more the principal benefits from reducing the high type’s
information rent and hence the more she distorts the low type’s length of experimentation. Matters are
more subtle for the other parameters. Consider, for example, an increase in β0. On the one hand, this
increases the social surplus from experimentation, which suggests that tL should increase. But there are
two other effects: holding fixed tL, penalties of lower magnitude can be used to incentivize effort from the
low type because the project is more likely to succeed (cf. Equation (6)), which has an effect of decreasing
the information rent for the high type; yet, a higher β0 also has a direct effect of increasing the information
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rent because the differing probability of success for the two types is only relevant when the project is good.
Despite these multiple effects, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that in net, it is always optimal to (weakly)
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Figure 2 – The low type’s optimal clawback contract under different values of µ0 and β0.
Both graphs have δ = 0.5, λL = 0.1, λH = 0.12, and c = 0.06. The left graph has β0 = 0.89,
µ0 = 0.3, and µ′0 = 0.6; the right graph has β0 = 0.85, β′0 = 0.89, and µ0 = 0.3. The first-best
entails tL = 15 on the left graph, and tL = 12 (for β0) and tL = 15 (for β′0) on the right graph.
A natural question is how the distortion in the low type’s stopping time, measured by tL − tL,
changes with parameters. Since tL does not depend on the probability of a high type, µ0, while t
L is
decreasing in this parameter, it is immediate that tL − tL is increasing in µ0. However, with respect to the
other parameters, β0 and c, Proposition 2 reveals that tL and t
L move in the same direction. It turns out
that the magnitude of the distortion, tL − tL, can either increase or decrease in both β0 and c, depending
on other parameters.18
4.2 Sketch of the proof
We now sketch in some detail how we prove Theorem 3 (and hence also Theorem 2). The arguments
reveal how the interaction of adverse selection, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning jointly shape
the optimal contracts. This subsection also serves as a guide to follow the formal proof in Appendix B.
18For example, increasing β0 can reduce tL− tL when µ0 is low but increase tL− tL when µ0 is high; the intuition
here is that a larger ex-ante probability of the high type makes increasing tL more costly in terms of information
rent.
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While we have defined a contract as C = (T,W0, b, l), it will be useful in this subsection alone
(so as to parallel the formal proof) to consider a larger space of contracts, where a contract is given by
C = (Γ,W0, b, l). The first element here is a set of periods, Γ ⊆ N \ {0}, at which the agent is not “locked
out,” i.e. at which he is allowed to choose whether to work or shirk. As discussed in fn. 10, this additional
instrument does not yield the principal any benefit, but it will be notationally convenient in the proof.
The termination date of the contract is now 0 if Γ = ∅ and otherwise max{t : t ∈ Γ}. We say that a contract
is connected if Γ = {1, . . . , T} for some T ; in this case we refer to T as the length of the contract, and T is
also the termination date. The agent’s actions are denoted by a = (at)t∈Γ.
The principal’s problem is to find a menu of optimal contracts, Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , b
θ, lθ) for each
θ ∈ {L,H}. Without loss of generality by Proposition 1, we focus on menus of clawback contracts: for
each θ ∈ {L,H}, Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , lθ). Clawback contracts are analytically convenient to deal with the
combination of adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard for reasons explained in Step 5 below.
Step 1: It is without loss to focus on contracts for type L that induce him to work in every non-
lockout period, i.e. on contracts in the set {CL : 1 ∈ αL(CL)}. The idea is as follows: fix any contract,
CL, in which there is some period, t ∈ ΓL, such that it would be suboptimal for type L to work in period
t. Since type L will not succeed in period t, one can modify CL to create a new contract, ĈL, in which
t /∈ Γ̂L, and lLt is “shifted up” by one period with an adjustment for discounting. This ensures that the
incentives for type L in all other periods remain unchanged, and critically, that no matter what behavior
would have been optimal for type H under contract CL, the new contract is less attractive to type H , i.e.
UH0 (C
L,αH(CL)) ≥ UH0 (ĈL,αH(ĈL)).
Step 2: Given Step 1, the principal can optimize over menus of clawback contracts in which the
low type’s contract induces him to work in every (non-lockout) period, subject to, for each θ ∈ {L,H},
(ICθa), (IRθ), and (ICθ,θ
′
). Call this program [P]. Since it is not obvious a priori which constraints in this
program bind, and in particular what action plan the high type may use when taking the low type’s
contract, we focus instead on a relaxed program, [RP1], that (i) ignores (IRH ) and (ICLH ), and (ii) re-
places (ICHL) by a relaxed version, called (Weak-ICHL), that only requires type H to prefer taking his
contract and following an optimal action plan over taking type L’s contract and working in every period.
Formally, (ICHL) requires UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH(CL)) whereas (Weak-ICHL) requires only
UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) ≥ UH0 (CL,1). We emphasize that this restriction on type H’s action plan under type
L’s contract is not without loss for an arbitrary contractCL; i.e., given an arbitraryCL with 1 ∈ αL(CL), it
need not be the case that 1 ∈ αH(CL). The reason is that because of their differing probabilities of success
from working in future periods (conditional on the good state), the two types trade off current and future
penalties differently when considering exerting effort in the current period. In particular, the desire to
avoid future penalties provides more of an incentive for the low type to work in the current period than
the high type.19
19To substantiate this point, consider any two-period clawback contract under which it is optimal for both types
to work in each period. It can be verified that changing the first-period penalty by +ε1 > 0 while simultaneously
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The relaxation of (ICHL) to (Weak-ICHL) is a critical step in making the program tractable, and we
will see that this turns out to work because tH > tL. In the relaxed program [RP1], it is straightforward
to show that (Weak-ICHL) and (IRL) must bind at an optimum: otherwise, time-zero transfers in one of
the two contracts can be profitably lowered without violating any of the constraints. Consequently, one
can substitute from the binding version of these constraints to rewrite the objective function as the sum
of total surplus less an information rent for the high type, as in the standard approach.20 We are left with
a relaxed program, [RP2], whose objective is to maximize social surplus less the high type’s information
rent, and whose only constraints are the direct moral hazard constraints (ICHa ) and (ICLa ), where type L
must work in all periods. This program is tractable because it can be solved by separately optimizing over
each type’s clawback contract. The following steps, 3–6, derive an optimal contract for type L in program
[RP2] that has useful properties.
Step 3: We show that there is an optimal clawback contract for type L that is connected. A rough
intuition is as follows.21 Because type L is required to work in all non-lockout periods, the value of the
objective function in program [RP2] can be improved by removing any lockout periods in one of two
ways: either by “shifting up” the sequence of effort and penalties or by terminating the contract early
(suitably adjusting for discounting in either case). Shifting up the sequence of effort and penalties elimi-
nates inefficient delays in type L’s experimentation, but it also increases the rent given to type H , because
the penalties — which are more likely to be borne by type L than type H — are now paid earlier. Con-
versely, terminating the contract early reduces the rent given to type H by lowering the total penalties in
the contract, but it also shortens experimentation by type L. It turns out that either of these modifications
may be beneficial to the principal, but at least one of them will be if the initial contract is not connected.
Step 4: Given any termination date TL, there are many penalty sequences that can be used by a
connected clawback contract of length TL to induce the low-ability agent to work in each period 1, . . . , TL.
We construct the unique sequence, call it l(TL), that ensures that the low type’s incentive constraint for
effort binds in each period of the contract, i.e. in any period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}, the low type is indifferent
between working (and then choosing any optimal effort profile in subsequent periods) and shirking (and
then choosing any optimal effort profile in subsequent periods), given the past history of effort. The intu-




L) = −c+ (1− βLTLλL)lLTL(TL). Iteratively working backward using a one-step deviation principle,
changing the second period penalty by−ε2 < 0 would preserve type θ’s incentive to work in period one if and only
if ε1 ≤ (1− λθ)δε2. Note that because −ε2 < 0, both types will continue to work in period two independent of their
action in period one. Consequently, the initial contract can always be modified in a way that preserves optimality
of working in both periods for the low type, but makes it optimal for the high type to shirk in period one and work
in period two.
20It is worth emphasizing, however, that this approach only works in the relaxed program, [RP1]. In the full
program [P], one cannot directly establish that either (IRL) or (ICHL) must bind. This contrast with the standard
approach is because of dynamic moral hazard.
21For the intuition that follows, assume that all penalties being discussed are negative transfers, i.e. transfers
from the agent to the principal.
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this pins down penalties in each earlier period through the (forward-looking) incentive constraint for ef-
fort in each period. Naturally, for any TL and t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}, lLt (TL) < 0, i.e. as suggested by the term
“penalty”, the agent pays the principal each time there is a failure.
Step 5: We next show that any connected clawback contract for type L that solves program [RP2]
must use the penalty structure lL(·) of Step 4. The idea is that any slack in the low type’s incentive
constraint for effort in any period can be used to modify the contract to strictly reduce the high type’s
expected payoff from taking the low type’s contract (without affecting the low type’s behavior or expected
payoff), based on the fact that the high type succeeds with higher probability in every period when taking
the low type’s contract.22
Although this logic is intuitive, a formal argument must deal with the challenge that modifying
a transfer in any period to reduce slack in the low type’s incentive constraint for effort in that period
has feedback on incentives in every prior period — the dynamic agency problem. Our restriction to
clawback contracts helps significantly here because clawback contracts have the property that reducing
the incentive to exert effort in any period t by decreasing the severity of the penalty in period t has a
positive feedback of also reducing the incentive for effort in earlier periods, since the continuation value
of reaching period t increases. Due to this positive feedback, we are able to show that the low type’s
incentive for effort in a given period of a connected clawback contract can be modified without affecting
his incentives in any other period by solely adjusting the penalties in that period and the previous one. In
particular, in an arbitrary connected clawback contractCL, if type L’s incentive constraint is slack in some
period t, we can increase lLt and reduce lLt−1 in a way that leaves type L’s incentives for effort unchanged
in every period s 6= t while still being satisfied in period t. We then verify that this “local modification”
strictly reduces the high type’s information rent.
By contrast, bonuses have a negative feedback: reducing the bonus in a period t increases the incen-
tive to work in prior periods because the continuation value of reaching period t decreases. Consequently,
keeping incentives for effort in earlier periods unchanged after reducing the bonus in period t would re-
quire a “global modification” of reducing the bonus in all prior periods, not just the previous period. This
makes the analysis with bonus contracts (or any non-clawback contracts) significantly less tractable.
Step 6: In light of Steps 3–5, an optimal contract for type L in program [RP2] can be found by just
choosing the optimal length of connected clawback contracts with the penalty structure lL(·). We first
show (Step 6a of Subsection B.6) that the optimal length, tL, cannot be larger than the first-best stopping
time: tL ≤ tL. This is a monotone comparative statics exercise. The intuition is that incentivizing over-
experimentation by type L cannot be optimal because that would not only reduce efficiency but also
increase the rent given to type H . The latter point is because lLt (TL) < 0 for any t and TL and type H is
less likely than type L to reach any period given that both types work in every period.
22This is because the constraint (Weak-ICHL) in program [RP2] effectively constrains the high type in this way,
even though, as previously noted, it may not be optimal for the high type to work in each period when taking an
arbitrary contract for the low type.
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This comparative statics exercise also allows us establish (in Step 6b of Subsection B.6) that the
optimal contract for the low type is generically unique.
Step 7: Let CL be the contract for type L identified in Steps 3–6.23 The final step is to show
that there is a solution to [RP2] that combines CL with a suitable onetime-clawback contract for the high
type and also solves the original program [P]. First, we show that αH(CL) = 1, i.e. if type H were to take
contractCL, it would be optimal for him to work in all periods 1, . . . , tL. The intuition is as follows: under
contract CL, type H has a higher expected probability of success from working in any period t ≤ tL, no
matter his prior choices of effort, than does type L in period t given that type L has exerted effort in
all prior periods (recall 1 ∈ αL(CL)). The argument relies on Step 6 having established that tL ≤ tL,





L for any history of effort by type H in periods 1, . . . , t− 1. Then, we verify that because CL
makes type L indifferent between working and shirking in each period up to tL (given that he has worked
in all prior periods), type H would find it strictly optimal to work in each period up to tL no matter his
prior history of effort, and hence αH(CL) = 1. It follows that if type H’s contract is chosen to satisfy
(Weak-ICHL) then it will also satisfy (ICHL) and (IRH ); the latter holds because UH0 (C
L
,1) ≥ UL0 (CL,1).
Lastly, we show that by choosing a onetime-clawback contract for type H that imposes a suffi-
ciently severe penalty in period tH and compensating type H through the initial transfer WH0 , the princi-
pal maximizes the social surplus from the high type, satisfies (Weak-ICHL), and also satisfies and (ICLH ).
In particular, (ICLH ) is satisfied because the principal can exploit the two types’ differing probabilities of
success by making the onetime-clawback contract for type H “risky enough” to deter type L from taking
it while still satisfying (Weak-ICHL) and hence (IRH ). This is analogous to the argument used for the case
of no moral hazard in the proof of Theorem 1.
4.3 Bonus contracts
As explained earlier, it is analytically convenient to work with clawback contracts to derive the second-
best solution. A weakness of clawback contracts, however, is that while we have imposed an ex-ante
participation constraint for the agent, they will not satisfy interim participation constraints. In other words,
in the implementation of Theorem 3, the agent of either type θ would “walk away” from his contract in
any period t ∈ {1, . . . , tθ} if he could. This can be remedied by using the equivalence result of Proposi-
tion 1, as follows:
Theorem 4. Assume tH > tL. The second-best can also be implemented using a menu of bonus contracts. Specifi-
23The initial transfer in C
L
is set to make the participation constraint for type L bind.
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cally, the principal offers the low type the bonus contract CL = (tL,WL0 , b






where lL is the optimal clawback-contract penalty sequence given in Theorem 3, andWL0 is chosen to make the partic-
ipation constraint, (IRL), bind. For the high type, the principal can use a constant-bonus contractCH = (tH ,WH0 , b
H)
with a suitably chosen WH0 and b
H > 0.
Generically, the above contract is the unique optimal contract for type L within the class of bonus con-
tracts. This implementation satisfies interim participation constraints in each period for each type, i.e. each type θ’s
continuation utility at the beginning of any period t ∈ {1, . . . , tθ} in Cθ is non-negative.
A proof is omitted because the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to verify that each bonus contract
in Theorem 4 is equivalent to the corresponding clawback contract in Theorem 3, and hence the (second-
best) optimality of those clawback contracts implies the optimality of these bonus contracts. Note from




L , where lL
t
L is the termination-date
penalty in the optimal clawback contract for type L. This is intuitive because the incentive to work in
the final period depends only on the difference between the bonus and the penalty in that period. In
earlier periods, the relationship between the bonuses in the optimal bonus contract and the penalties in
the optimal clawback contract is more complex because future bonuses and future penalties affect present
incentive considerations differently, for reasons previously noted. Using (6), it is also readily verified that







+ δbLt+1 for any t ∈ {1, . . . , tL − 1}, (8)
and hence the reward for success increases over time. Notice that when δ = 1, type L’s bonus contract
becomes a constant-bonus contract, analogous to the clawback contract in Theorem 3 becoming a onetime-
clawback contract.
5 Optimal Contracts when tH ≤ tL
We now turn to the case where the first-best stopping times are ordered tH ≤ tL. The principal’s max-
imization program is the same as that defined at the beginning of Section 4, but solving the program is
now substantially more difficult. To understand why, consider Figure 3, which depicts the two types’
“no-shirk expected marginal product” curves, βθtλθ, as a function of time.24 For any parameters, these
24For convenience, the figure is drawn ignoring integer constraints.
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H − βLt∗λL ≥ 0 > βHt∗+1λH − βLt∗+1λL. (9)
When the first-best stopping times are ordered tH > tL, it follows that tL < t∗, as is the case for
the high effort cost in Figure 3. Then, for any t ≤ tL, the high type always has a higher expected marginal
product than the low type conditional on the agent working in all prior periods. It is this fact that allowed
us to prove Theorem 3 by conjecturing that the high type would work in every period when taking the
low type’s contract.
By contrast, when the first-best stopping times are ordered tH ≤ tL, it follows that tL ≥ t∗, as is
the case for the low effort cost in Figure 3. Since the second-best stopping time for the low type can be
arbitrarily close to his first-best stopping time (e.g. if the prior on the low type, 1−µ0, is sufficiently large),
it is no longer valid to conjecture that the high type will work in every period when taking the low type’s
optimal contract. The reason is that at some period after t∗, given that both types have worked in each
prior period, the high type can be sufficiently more pessimistic than the low type that the high type finds
it optimal to shirk in some or all of the remaining periods, even though λH > λL and the low type would
be willing to work for the contract’s duration.25 Indeed, this will necessarily be true in the last period of
the low type’s contract if this period is larger than t∗ and the contract makes the low type just indifferent
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Figure 3 – No-shirk expected marginal product curves with β0 = 0.99, λL = 0.28, λH = 0.35.
25More precisely, the relaxed program, [RP1], described in Step 2 of the proof sketch of Theorem 3 can yield
a solution which is not feasible in the original program, because the constraint (ICHL) is violated; the high type
would deviate from accepting his contract to accepting the low ype’s contract and then shirk in some periods.
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Solving the principal’s program without being able to restrict attention to some suitable subset of
action plans for the high type when he takes the low type’s contract is daunting. For an arbitrary δ, we
have been unable to find a valid restriction. The difficulty is illustrated by the following example:
Example 1. Consider any set of parameters {β0, c, λL, λH} satisfying the following four conditions:




2. The expected marginal product for type H after one period of work is less than that of type L after one period







3. Ex-ante, type H is more likely to have succeeded by working in one period than type L is after working in
two periods: (1− λH) < (1− λL)2.



















(There is an open and dense set of parameters satisfying these conditions.) Further, fix µ0 sufficiently small
so that it is never optimal to distort the stopping time of the low type, i.e. tL = tL = 3.
For any such parameter constellation, the optimal clawback contract for the low type as a function of δ,
CL(δ) = (3,WL0 (δ), l
L(δ)), is such that
αH(CL(δ)) =

{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)} if δ ∈ (0, δ∗)
{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ = δ∗
{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ ∈ (δ∗, 1)
{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ = 1.
Figure 4 illustrates this graphically and also shows the penalty sequence in the optimal clawback contract
as a function of δ for a particular set of parameters.26 Notice that the only action plan that is in αH(CL(δ)) for
all δ is the non-consecutive-work plan (1, 0, 1), but for each value of δ at least one other plan is also optimal, whose
identity varies with δ. Interestingly, (1, 1, 0) /∈ αH(CL(δ)) for δ ∈ (δ∗, 1).27
Nevertheless, we are able to solve the problem when δ = 1. To state the result, it useful to say
that a contract for type θ ∈ {L,H} is essentially unique when δ = 1 if it is unique up to payoff-irrelevant
modifications that add delays where type θ would shirk in some periods of the contract; such multiplicity
is unavoidable when both the principal and the agent do not discount the future.
26The initial transfer WL0 in each case is determined by making the participation constraint of the low type bind.
27The lack of lower semi-continuity of αH(CL(δ)) at δ = 1 is not an accident, as we will discuss subsequently.
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Optimal Contracts: Sketch of Proof


























































Figure 4 – The optimal clawback contract for the low type in Example 1 with β0 = 0.86,
c = 0.1, λL = 0.75, λH = 0.95 (left graph) and the optimal action profiles for the high type
under this contract (right graph).
Theorem 5. Assume δ = 1 and tH ≤ tL. There is an optimal menu in which the principal separates the











L) for the low type, such that:
















, where tHL := max
a∈αH(CL)
# {n : an = 1};
3. WL0 > 0 is such that the participation constraint, (IR
L), binds;
4. Type H gets an information rent: UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) > 0;
5. 1 ∈ αH(CH), 1 ∈ αL(CL).
Generically, the above contract is the essentially-unique optimal contract for type L within the class of clawback
contracts.
Proof. See Appendix D. Q.E.D.
For δ = 1, the optimal menus of clawbacks contracts characterized in Theorem 5 for tH ≤ tL share
some common properties with those characterized in Theorem 3 for tH > tL: in both cases, a onetime-
clawback contract is used for the low type, there is no distortion in the stopping time of the high type
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whereas the low type is induced to (weakly) under-experiment, and the high type earns an information
rent. On the other hand, part 2 of Theorem 5 highlights two differences: (i) it will generally be the case
in the optimal CL that when tH ≤ tL, 1 /∈ αH(CL), whereas for tH > tL, αH(CL) = 1; and (ii) when
tH ≤ tL, it can be optimal for the principal to induce the low type to work in each period by satisfying the
low type’s incentive constraint for effort with slack (i.e. with strict inequality), whereas when tH > tL,
the penalty sequence makes this effort constraint bind in each period.
The intuition for these differences derives from information-rent considerations. The high type
earns an information rent because by following the same effort profile as the low type he is less likely
to incur any penalty for failure, and hence has a higher utility from any clawback contract than the low
type.28 Minimizing the rent through this channel suggests minimizing the magnitude of the penalties that










However, when tL > t∗ (which is only possible when tH ≤ tL), the high type would find it optimal under




thus through Bayes’ rule,
(1− λH)T < (1− λL)tL−1. (11)
However, because T < tL, it is possible — and will be true for an open and dense set of parameters —
that T is such that the high type is more likely to incur the onetime penalty than the low type, i.e. that
(1− λH)T > (1− λL)tL .29 (12)
But in such a case, the penalty given in (10) would not be optimal because the principal can lower lL
t
L
to reduce the information rent, which she can keep doing until the high type finds it optimal to work
for T + 1 periods, i.e. the principal would set lL
t





. At this point, because (11) implies
(1− λH)T+1 < (1− λL)tL , the high type becomes less likely to incur the onetime penalty than the low
type, and lowering l
t
L any further would increase the information rent. This explains part 2 of Theo-
rem 5.
Intuitively, inequalities (11) and (12) can simultaneously hold because time is discrete. It can be
shown that when the length of time intervals vanishes, in real-time the tHL and tL in the statement of




H , and hence lL
t





is always optimal, just as in Theorem 3
when δ = 1.
Remark 2. The proof of Theorem 5 provides an algorithm to solve for an optimal menu of contracts when
28Strictly speaking, this logic applies so long as lt ≤ 0 for all t in the clawback contract.
29The ex-ante probability for the agent of type θ of incurring the onetime penalty if he works for t(θ) periods is
β0(1−λH)t(θ)+1−β0, which implies that the comparison between the two types turns on the ranking of (1− λθ)t(θ).
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tH ≤ tL and δ = 1. For each pair of integers (s, t) such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ tL, one can compute the principal’s
payoff from using the onetime-clawback contract for type L given by Theorem 5 when tL is replaced by t
and tHL is replaced by s in part 2. One then just optimizes over (s, t).
How do we prove Theorem 5 in light of the difficulties described earlier of finding a suitable
restriction on the high type’s behavior when taking the low-type’s contract? The answer is that when
δ = 1, one can conjecture that the optimal contract for the low type must be a onetime-clawback contract
(as was also true when tH > tL). Notice that because of no discounting, any onetime-clawback contract
would make the agent of either type indifferent among all action plans that involve the same number of
periods of work. In particular, a stopping strategy — an action plan that involves consecutive work for
some number of periods followed by shirking thereafter — is always optimal for either type in a onetime-
clawback contract. The heart of the proof of Theorem 5 establishes that it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to clawback contracts for the low type under which the high type would find it optimal
to use a stopping strategy (see Subsection D.5 in Appendix D). With this in hand, we are then able to
show that a onetime-clawback contract for the low type is indeed optimal (see Subsection D.6). Finally,
the rent-minimization considerations described above are used to complete the argument. Observe that
optimality of a onetime-clawback contract for the low type and that of a stopping strategy for the high
type under such a contract is consistent with the solution in Example 1 for δ = 1, as seen in Figure 4.
Moreover, the example plainly shows that such a strategy space restriction will not generally be valid
when δ < 1.30
We end this section by providing the bonus-contracts implementation of Theorem 5:
Theorem 6. Assume δ = 1 and tH ≤ tL. The second-best can also be implemented using a menu of constant-
bonus contracts: CL = (tL,WL0 , b
L) with bL = −lL
t





L is given in Theorem 5, and
CH = (tH ,WH0 , b
H) with a suitably chosen WH0 and b
H > 0. Generically, this CL is the essentially-unique
optimal contract for type L within the class of bonus contracts.
A proof is omitted since this follows directly from Theorem 5 and the proof of Proposition 1 (using
δ = 1). Analogous to our discussion around Theorem 4, the implementation in Theorem 6 satisfies interim
participation constraints whereas that of Theorem 5 does not.
30Due to the agent’s indifference over all action plans that involve the same number of periods of work in a
onetime-clawback contract when δ = 1, the correspondence αH(CL(δ)) will generally fail lower semi-continuity
at δ = 1. In particular, the low type’s optimal contract for δ close to 1 may be such that a stopping strategy is not
optimal for the high type under this contract. However, the correspondence αH(CL(δ)) is upper semi-continuous
and the optimal contract is continuous at δ = 1. All these points can be seen in Figure 4.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Private observability and disclosure
Suppose that project success is privately observed by the agent but can be verifiably disclosed. We assume
in this private-observability setting that the principal’s payoff from project success obtains only when the
agent discloses it and contracts are conditioned not on project success but rather the disclosure of project
success. Private observability introduces additional constraints for the principal because the agent must
also now be incentivized to not withhold project success. For example, in a bonus contract where δbt+1 >
bt, an agent who obtains success in period t would strictly prefer to withhold it and continue to period
t+ 1, shirk in that period, and then reveal the success at the end of period t+ 1.
Theorem 7. Even if project success is privately observed by the agent, the menus of contracts identified in Theorems
3–6 remain optimal and implement the same outcome as when project success is publicly observable.
Proof. It suffices to show that in each of the menus, each of the contracts would induce an agent (of either
type) to reveal project success immediately when it is obtained.
Consider first the menus of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5: for each θ ∈ {L,H}, the contract for type
θ, Cθ, is a clawback contract in which lθt ≤ 0 for all t. Hence, no matter which contract the agent takes and
no matter his type, it is optimal to reveal a success when obtained.
For the implementation in Theorem 4, observe from (8) that type L’s bonus contract has the prop-
erty that δbLt+1 ≤ bLt for all t ∈ {1, . . . , tL−1}; moreover, this property also holds in type L’s bonus contract
in Theorem 6 and in type H’s bonus contracts in both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6, as these contracts are
constant-bonus contracts. Hence, under all these contracts, it is optimal for the agent of either type to
disclose success immediately when obtained. Q.E.D.
Therefore, project success being privately observed by the agent does not reduce the principal’s
payoff compared to the baseline setting where project success is publicly observable (and contractible),
so long as the agent can verifiably disclose project success. However, unlike the menus of Theorems 3–6,
not every optimal menu under public observability is optimal under private observability.31 In this sense,
these optimal menus have a desirable robustness property that other optimal menus need not.
31In particular, there are optimal menus of bonus contracts under public observability that are suboptimal under
private observability because the contract given to type H is such that he would have an incentive to delay dis-







HbHt+1,which can be satisfied with bHt < δbHt+1, in which case the contract would be suboptimal
under private observability as noted earlier. An analogous point applies to menus of clawback contracts.
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6.2 The role of learning
We have assumed that β0 ∈ (0, 1). If instead β0 = 1 then there would be no learning about the project
quality, and the first best would entail both types working until project success has been obtained.32 How
would the absence of learning change our results?
To simplify the discussion, suppose that there is some (possibly large) exogenous date T at which
the game ends,33 so that the first-best stopping times are tL = tH = T . The principal’s program can be
solved here just as in Section 4, because βHt λH = λH > β
L
t λ
L = λL for all t ≤ T . In the absence of
learning, the social surplus from the low type working is constant over time. So long as parameters are
such that it is not optimal for the principal to exclude the low type (i.e. tL > 0), then it turns out that
there is no distortion: tL = tH = T . We provide a more complete argument in Appendix E, but to see the
intuition consider a large T . Then, even though both types are likely to succeed prior to T , the probability





as t → ∞. Therefore, it would not be optimal to locally distort the length of experimentation from T
because such a distortion would generate a larger efficiency loss from the low type than a gain from
reducing the high type’s information rent. By contrast, when β0 < 1 and there is learning, this logic
fails because the incremental social surplus from the low type working vanishes over time. Therefore,
learning from experimentation plays an important role in our results: for any parameters with β0 < 1
under which there is distortion of the low type’s length of experimentation without entirely excluding
him, there would instead be no distortion were β0 = 1.
6.3 Adverse selection on other dimensions
Another important modeling assumption in this paper is that pre-contractual hidden information is about
the agent’s ability. Let us briefly comment on two alternatives.
First, suppose the agent has hidden information about his cost of effort but his ability is commonly
known; specifically, the low type’s cost of working in any period is cL > 0 whereas the high type’s cost
is cH ∈ (0, cL). It is immediate that the first-best stopping time for the high type would always be larger
than that of the low type because there is no speed-of-learning effect. Hence, the problem can be solved
following our approach in Section 4 for tH > tL.34 However, not only would this alternative model miss
32In a setting without adverse selection but with limited liability, Biais et al. (2010) study a continuous-time
principal-agent problem where large losses arrive according to a Poisson process whose intensity is determined
by the agent’s effort, so that the first best involves always exerting effort.
33It should be clear that nothing would have changed in the earlier analysis if we had assumed existence of such
a suitably large end date, in particular so long as T ≥ max{tH , tL}.
34This applies to binary effort choices. Another alternative would be for the agent to choose effort from a richer
set, e.g. R+, and effort costs be convex with one type having a lower marginal cost than the other. The speed-of-
learning effect would emerge in this setting because the two types would generally choose different effort levels in
any period. Analyzing such a problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the considerations involved with tH ≤ tL, but furthermore, it also obviates interesting features of the
problem even when tH > tL. For example, in this setting it would be optimal for the high type to work in
all periods in any contract in which it is optimal for the low type to work in all periods; recall that this is
not true in our model even when tH > tL (cf. fn. 19).
Another source of adverse selection would be about project quality. Suppose that the agent’s
ability is commonly known but he has a private noisy signal about project quality: specifically, there
is a high type whose belief about the state being good is βH0 ∈ (0, 1) and a low type whose belief is
βL0 ∈ (0, βH0 ).35 Again, the first-best stopping times here would always have tH > tL and the problem can
be studied following our approach to this case.
6.4 Limited liability
To focus on adverse selection, we have abstracted away from limited-liability considerations. While a
thorough analysis of limited liability constraints must be postponed to future research, we can make a
few observations.
Consider the requirement that all transfers must be above some minimum threshold, say zero.
This immediately rules out the provision of incentives through penalties for failure, so focus on bonus
contracts (with non-negative bonuses and non-negative initial transfer), and for simplicity assume no
discounting and tL < tH . The limited liability constraint implies that both types of the agent will acquire
an information rent. Without loss, the principal can be restricted to use constant-bonus contracts, because
of limited liability and the dynamic agency considerations with no discounting.36 As the length of time
intervals vanishes, this implies that implementing the first-best requires giving all the surplus to the agent
(i.e. a constant bonus of one until the first-best stopping time). Consequently, there must be efficiency dis-
tortions in the second best. There are three important points to make. First, the principal will distort down
both types’ stopping times: the low type’s stopping time alone cannot be profitably distorted since the low
type would simply deviate and take the high type’s contract. Second, it can be shown that the principal
will optimally implement the second-best stopping time for the low type, tL, by using a constant-bonus





. Third, the second
best has tL ≤ tH , because otherwise the principal can improve upon the menu by just offering both types
the low type’s contract, which would induce the high type to experiment longer and would not increase
his payoff. Thus, even though both types’ second-best stopping times are now distorted, their ordering is
the same as without limited liability.
35Gerardi and Maestri (2012) consider a similar source of adverse selection albeit in a different setting. We em-
phasize that we have in mind a setting with a common prior and a private signal for the agent, as opposed to a
setting with non-common priors. The latter would involve quite distinct considerations and may be interesting in
its own right.
36For the same reason, Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011) also find that constant bonuses are optimal when there is only
one agent in their principal-agent(s) extension. Note that they do not study adverse selection.
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Finally, we note that in our dynamic setting, there are less severe forms of limited liability that may
be relevant in applications. For example, it may be reasonable to only impose the requirement that the
sum of penalties at any point cannot exceed the initial transfer given to the agent. We would conjecture
that similar conclusions to those discussed above would also emerge in this case, because both types of
the agent will again acquire an information rent.
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Appendices: Notation and Terminology
It is expositionally convenient in proving our results to work with an apparently larger set of contracts
than that defined in the main text. Specifically, in the Appendices, we assume that the principal can
stipulate binding “lockout” periods in which the agent is prohibited from working. As discussed in
fn. 10 of the main text, this instrument cannot ultimately yield any benefit to the principal because the
agent can be induced to shirk in a period regardless of his type and history of work by just setting a
sufficiently negative bonus for success in that period. Nevertheless, stipulating lockout periods helps
with simplifying notation and statements in the arguments we make.
Accordingly, we denote a general contract by C = (Γ,W0, b, l), where all the elements are as
introduced in the main text, except that instead of having the termination date of the contract in the first
component, we now have a set of periods, Γ ⊆ N \ {0}, at which the agent is not locked out, i.e. at which
he is allowed to choose whether to work or shirk. Note that, without loss, b = (bt)t∈Γ and l = (lt)t∈Γ,37
and the agent’s actions are denoted by a = (at)t∈Γ, where at = 1 if the agent works in period t ∈ Γ and
at = 0 if the agent shirks. The termination date of the contract is 0 if Γ = ∅ and is otherwise max{t : t ∈ Γ},
which we require to be finite.38 We say that a contract is connected if Γ = {1, . . . , T} for some T ; in this case
we refer to T as the length of the contract, T is also the termination date, and we write C = (T,W0, b, l).
A Proofs of Benchmark Results
A.1 Proposition 1
We prove the result more generally for contracts with lockouts. Fix a contract C = (Γ,W0, b, l). The result
is trivial if Γ = ∅, so assume Γ 6= ∅. Let T = max Γ. For any period t ∈ Γ with t < T , define the smallest
successor period in Γ as σ(t) = min{t′ : t′ > t, t′ ∈ Γ}; moreover, let σ(0) = min Γ.
Given any action profile for the agent, the agent’s time-zero expected discounted payoff when
his type is θ ∈ {L,H} and the principal’s time-zero expected discounted payoff only depend upon a
contract’s induced vector of discounted transfers, say (τt)t∈Γ when success is obtained in period t and on
the discounted transfer when there is no success. Hence, it suffices to construct a clawback contract, Ĉ,
and bonus contract, C˜, that induce the same such vector of transfers as C.
To this end, define the clawback contract Ĉ = (Γ, Ŵ0, l̂) as follows:
(a) For any t such that t < T and t ∈ Γ, l̂t = lt − bt + δσ(t)−tbσ(t).
(b) l̂T = lT − bT .
(c) Ŵ0 = W0 + δσ(0)bσ(0).
Define the bonus contract C˜ = (Γ, W˜0, b˜) as follows:
37There is no loss in not allowing for transfers in lockout periods.
38One can show that this restriction does not hurt the principal.
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Consider first the discounted transfer induced by each of these three contracts if success is not
obtained. For C, it is W0 +
∑
t∈Γ δ










lt − bt + δσ(t)−tbσ(t)
)




where the first equality follows from the definition of Ĉ and the second from algebraic simplification. For




all three contracts induce the same transfer in the event of no success.
Next, for any s ∈ Γ, consider a success obtained in period s. The discounted transfer in this event





















where again the first equality uses the definition of Ĉ and the second follows from simplification. For C˜,
since there are no penalties, the corresponding discounted transfer is
W˜0 + δ
















where again the first equality is by definition of C˜ and the second from simplification. Hence, all three
contracts induce the same transfer in the event of success in any period s ∈ Γ.
A.2 Theorem 1
We consider the cases of no adverse selection and no moral hazard separately.
No adverse selection
The claim that the principal can implement the first best and extract all the surplus with constant-bonus
contracts follows from the analysis in the text. We now show that the principal can also do this with
onetime-clawback contracts. Since the agent’s type is observable, suppose the principal offers a type θ
agent a onetime-clawback contract Cθ = (tθ,W θ0 , l
θ
tθ
) where W θ0 is chosen such that, conditional on the























First best requires the agent to work in all periods until tθ so long as success has not been obtained. From
the one-step deviation principle, the incentive compatibility conditions for effort are summarized by the











 ≥ c. (A.1)
The right-hand side of (A.1) is the constant cost of effort. The left-hand side is the benefit of effort at
any time t (given that effort has been exerted and success not obtained at all prior periods): with proba-
bility λθβθt there will be a success in period t and the agent saves both the expected discounted penalty,
δt
θ−t (1− λθ)tθ−t (−lθ
tθ
)





1− λθ)s−t−1 c. It
follows that the agent will work in all periods if lθ
tθ
is chosen low enough, i.e., the clawback penalty is
severe enough. In this case, the first best is implemented and the principal extracts all the surplus.
No moral hazard
Now consider the case without moral hazard, i.e. the agent’s effort in any period still costs him c > 0
but is observable and contractible. We can thus ignore the agent’s incentive compatibility constraints for
effort by, for example, assuming that the principal stipulates a penalty for shirking (as long as success has
not been obtained and up to the termination date) that is severe enough so that the agent would indeed
find it optimal to work in every period regardless of his type and regardless of which contract he accepts.
Given that the agent always works, we show that the principal can implement the first best and ex-
tract all the surplus with a menu of onetime-clawback contracts,CH = (tH ,WH0 , l
H
tH






> 0 > lH
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β0(1− λθ)tθ + (1− β0)
]
= 0. (A.2)



















1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]+ β0lHtHδtH [(1− λL)tH − (1− λH)tH] . (A.3)



















1− λL)t−1 − (1− λH)t−1]+ β0lLtLδtL [(1− λH)tL − (1− λL)tL] . (A.4)
Expression (A.3) is an affine function of lH
tH
with a strictly positive coefficient on lH
tH
(since λH > λL),
and expression (A.4) is an affine function of lL
tL
with a strictly negative coefficient. Hence, we can choose
lH
tH
< 0 sufficiently low and lL
tL
> 0 sufficiently large so that (A.3) and (A.4) are negative, in which case
each type prefers to take his own contract over the other’s. Thus, the first best is implemented and the
principal extracts all the surplus.
The proof that the principal can also achieve this using a menu of constant-bonus contracts is
analogous and thus omitted.
B Proof of Theorem 3
The proof below for Theorem 3 also proves Theorem 2. We remind the reader that Subsection 4.2 provides
an outline and intuition for the proof.
Without loss of generality by Proposition 1, we focus on clawback contracts throughout the proof.
B.1 Step 1: Low type always works
We first show that it is without loss to focus on contracts for the low type in which he is prescribed to work
in every period. To prove this, denote the set of clawback contracts by C, and recall that the principal’s













subject to, for all θ, θ′ ∈ {L,H},
aθ ∈ αθ(Cθ), (ICθa)
U θ0 (C
θ,aθ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
U θ0 (C







Suppose there is a solution to this program, (CH ,CL,aH ,aL), with aL 6= 1 andCL = (ΓL,WL0 , lL).
It suffices to show that there is another solution to the program, (CH , ĈL,aH ,1), where ĈL =
(




(i) 1 ∈ αL(ĈL);
(ii) UL0 (C
L,aL) = UL0 (Ĉ
L,1);
(iii) ΠL0 (C
L,aL) = ΠL0 (Ĉ
L,1); and
(iv) UH0 (C
L,αH(CL)) ≥ UH0 (ĈL,αH(ĈL)).
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To this end, let t = min{s : as = 0} and denote the largest preceding period in ΓL as
p(t) =
{








Γ̂L = ΓL\ {t} ;
l̂Ls =
{
lLs if s 6= p(t) and s ∈ Γ̂L,
lLs + δ
t−p(t)lLt if s = p(t) > 0;
ŴL0 =
{
WL0 if p(t) > 0,
WL0 + δ
tlLt if p(t) = 0.
Notice that under contract CL, the profile aL has type L shirking in period t and thus receiving
lLt with probability one conditional on not succeeding before this period; the new contract ĈL just locks
the agent out in period t and shifts the payment lLt up to the preceding non-lockout period, suitably
discounted. It follows that the incentives for effort for type L remain unchanged in any other period, i.e.
that aL−t ∈ αL(ĈL); moreover, since aLt = 0, both the principal’s payoff from type L under this contract
and type L’s payoff do not change. Finally, observe that for type H , no matter which action he would
take at t in any optimal action plan under CL (whether it is work or shirk), his payoff from ĈL must be
weakly lower because the lockout in period t is effectively as though he has been forced to shirk in period
t and receive lLt .
Performing this procedure repeatedly for each period in which the original profile aL prescribes
shirking yields a final contract ĈL which satisfies all the desired properties.
B.2 Step 2: Relaxing the program
By Step 1, we can restrict our attention to clawback contracts Cθ =
(
Γθ,W θ0 , l
θ
)
with type L’s contract















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )
















) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH (CL)) . (ICHL)
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To solve program [P], we solve a relaxed program and later verify that the solution is feasible in
(and hence is a solution to) [P]. Specifically, we relax three constraints in [P]: (i) we ignore (ICLH ) and
(IRH ), and (ii) we consider a weak version of (ICHL) in which type H is assumed to exert effort in all















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )








) ≥ UH0 (CL,1) . (Weak-ICHL)
It is clear that in any solution to program [RP1], (IRL) must be binding: otherwise, the initial
time-zero transfer from the principal to the agent in the contract CL can be reduced slightly to strictly
improve the second term of the objective function while not violating any of the constraints. Similarly,
(Weak-ICHL) must also bind because otherwise the time-zero transfer in the contract CH can be reduced
to improve the first term of the objective function without violating any of the constraints.
Using these two binding constraints and substituting in the formulae from equations (1) and (2),
we can rewrite the objective function (RP1) as the sum of expected total surplus less typeH’s “information














































































































 . (ICHa )
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A key observation is that this program [RP2] is separable, i.e. it can be solved by separately
maximizing (RP2) with respect to CL subject to (ICLa ) and separately maximizing (RP2) with respect to
(CH ,aH) subject to (ICHa ).
B.3 Step 3: Connected contracts for the low type
We now claim that in program [RP2], it is without loss to consider solutions in which the low type’s















































subject to (ICLa ),

























To avoid trivialities, consider any optimal CL with ΓL 6= ∅. First consider the possibility that
1 /∈ ΓL. In this case, construct a new clawback contract ĈL that is “shifted up by one period”:
Γ̂L = {s : s+ 1 ∈ ΓL},
l̂Ls = l
L




Clearly it remains optimal for the agent to work in every period in Γ̂L, and since the value of (B.1) must
have been weakly positive under CL, it is now weakly higher since the modification has just multiplied
it by δ−1 > 1. This procedure can be repeated for all lockout periods at the beginning of the contract, so
that without loss, we hereafter assume that 1 ∈ ΓL. We are of course done if ΓL is now connected, so also
assume that ΓL is not connected.
Let t◦ be the earliest lockout period in ΓL, i.e. t◦ = min{t : t /∈ ΓL and t◦ − 1 ∈ ΓL}. (Such
a t◦ > 1 exists given the preceding discussion.) We will argue that one of two possible modifications
preserves the agent’s incentive to work in all periods in the modified contract and weakly improves
the principal’s payoff. This suffices because the procedure can then be applied iteratively to produce a
connected contract.
Modification 1: Consider first a modified clawback contract ĈL that removes the lockout period
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t◦ and shortens the contract by one period as follows:
Γ̂L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1} ∪ {s : s ≥ t◦ and s+ 1 ∈ ΓL},
l̂Ls =

lLs if s < t◦ − 1,
lLs + ∆1 if s = t◦ − 1,




Note that in the above construction, ∆1 is a free parameter. We will find conditions on ∆1 such that type
L’s incentives for effort are unchanged and the principal is weakly better off.
For an arbitrary t, define
S(t) =
(












The value of (B.1) under CL is















The value of (B.1) after the modification to ĈL is





































Therefore, the modification benefits the principal if and only if
















δ−1 − 1) ∑
t∈ΓL,t>t◦
δtlLt R(t) + δ
t◦−1∆1R(t◦ − 1)




The above inequality is satisfied for any ∆1 if δ = 1, and if δ < 1, then after rearranging terms, the above





















Now turn to the incentives for effort for the agent of type L. Clearly, since CL induces the agent
to work in all periods, it remains optimal for the agent to work under ĈL in all periods beginning with t◦.
Consider the incentive constraint for effort in period t◦ − 1 under ĈL. Using (B.2), this is given by:
− βLt◦−1λL








 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.4)










 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.5)
If we choose ∆1 such that the left-hand side of (B.4) is equal to the left-hand side of (B.5), then
since it is optimal to work under the original contract in period t◦ − 1, it will also be optimal to work






























 [(1− λL) lLt − c] , (B.6)
where the second equality is because {t : t ∈ ΓL, t > t◦ − 1} = {t : t ∈ ΓL, t > t◦}, since t◦ /∈ ΓL. Note that
(B.6) implies ∆1 = 0 if δ = 1.
Now consider the incentive constraint for effort in any period τ < t◦ − 1. We will show that
because ∆1 is such that the left-hand side of (B.4) is equal to the left-hand side of (B.5), the fact that it
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was optimal to work in period τ under contract CL implies that it is optimal to work in period τ under









 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c, (B.7)
which is satisfied since CL induces the agent to work in all periods. The incentive constraint for effort in
period τ under ĈL can be written as:




















































































 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ,
where the first equality is from the construction of ĈL, the second equality uses (B.6), and the third
equality follows from algebraic simplification. Since the above constraint is identical to (B.7), it is satisfied.
Consequently, if δ = 1, this modification with ∆1 = 0 weakly benefits the principal while preserv-
ing the agent’s incentives, and we are done. So hereafter assume δ < 1, which requires us to also consider
another modification.
Modification 2: Now we consider a modified contract C˜L that eliminates all periods after t◦, de-
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fined as follows:
Γ˜L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1},
l˜Ls =
{
lLs if s < t◦ − 1,




Again, ∆2 is a free parameter above. We find conditions on ∆2 such that type L’s incentives are un-
changed and the principal is weakly better off.
The value of (B.1) under the modification C˜L is











δtlLt R(t) + δ





Therefore, using the previous formula for V (CL), this modification benefits the principal if and
only if













δtlLt R(t) + δ

























As with the previous modification, the only incentive constraint for effort that needs to be verified




) ≥ c. (B.9)










 [(1− λL) lLt − c] = ∆11− δ−1 , (B.10)
where the second equality follows from (B.6). But now, observe that (B.10) implies that either (B.3) or (B.8)
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is guaranteed to hold, and hence either the modification to ĈL or to C˜L weakly benefits the principal while
preserving the agent’s effort incentives.
Remark 3. Given δ < 1, the choice of ∆2 in (B.10) implies that if inequality (B.3) holds with equality then
so does inequality (B.8), and vice-versa. In other words, if neither of the modifications strictly benefits the
principal (while preserving the agent’s effort incentives), then it must be that both modifications leave the
principal’s payoff unchanged (while preserving the agent’s effort incentives).
B.4 Step 4: Defining the critical contract for the low type
Take any connected clawback contract, CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) that induces effort from the low type in each
period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}. We claim that the low type’s incentive constraint for effort binds at all periods if
















if t = TL. (B.11)
The proof of this claim is via three sub-steps; for the remainder of this step, since TL is given and
held fixed, we ease notation by just writing lL instead of lL(TL).
Step 4a: First, we argue that with the above penalty sequence, the low type is indifferent between
working and shirking in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} given that he has worked in all prior periods and
will do in all subsequent periods no matter his action at period t. In other words, we need to show that







1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.39 (B.12)
We prove that (B.12) is indeed satisfied for all t by induction. First, it is immediate from (B.11) that





































1− λL)s−t [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ,






















1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 .
Setting these payoffs from working and shirking equal to each other and manipulating terms yields (B.12).
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To show that (B.12) holds for t, it suffices to show that
−βLt λL





1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.












































, which is true by the definition
of lL in (B.11).
Step 4b: Next, we show that given the sequence lL, it would be optimal for the low type to work
in any period no matter the prior history of effort. The argument is by induction. Consider first the last
period, TL. Since no matter the history of prior effort, the current belief is some βL
TL
≥ βLTL , and hence
−βLTLλLl
L
t ≥ βLTLλLlLt = c,
it is optimal to work in the last period (note that the equality above is by definition).
Now assume inductively that the assertion is true for period t + 1 ≤ TL, and consider period
t < TL after any history of prior effort, with current belief βLt . Since we already showed that Equation







1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ≥ c,
and hence it is optimal for the agent to work in period t.
Step 4c: Finally, we argue that any profile of penalties, lL, that makes the low type’s incentive
constraint for effort bind at every period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} must coincide with lL, given that the clawback
contract must induce work from the low type in each period up to TL. Again, we use induction. Since lLTL
is the unique penalty that makes the agent indifferent between working and shirking at period TL given




TL . Note from Step 4b that it would remain
optimal for the agent to work in period TL given any profile of effort in prior periods.
For the inductive step, pick some period t < TL and assume that in every period x ∈ {t, . . . , TL},
the agent is indifferent between working and shirking given that he has worked in all prior periods, and
would also find it optimal to work at x following any other profile of effort prior to x. Under these
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1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c. (B.15)







1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ≥ c,
which, when set to bind, can be written as
− βLt λL





1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.
(B.16)









, and performing some
algebra shows that lLt = l
L
t . Moreover, by the reasoning in Step 4b, this also ensures that the agent would
find it optimal to work in period t for any other history of actions prior to period t.
B.5 Step 5: The critical contract is optimal
By Step 3, we can restrict attention in solving program [RP2] to connected clawback contracts for the low
type. For any TL, Step 4 identified a particular sequence of penalties, lL(TL). We now show that any
connected clawback contract for the low type that solves [RP2] must have precisely this penalty structure.
The proof involves two sub-steps; throughout, we hold an arbitrary TL fixed and, to ease notation,
drop the dependence of lL(·) on TL.
Step 5a: We first show that any connected clawback contract for the low type of length TL that
satisfies (ICLa ) and has lLt > l
L
t in some period t ≤ TL is not optimal. To prove this, consider any connected
clawback contract of length TL that satisfies (ICLa ) and specifies a penalty lLt′ > l
L




t : t ≤ TL and lLt > lLt
}
.
Observe that we must have tˆ < TL because otherwise (ICLa ) would be violated in period TL.
Furthermore, by definition of tˆ, lLt ≤ lLt for all TL ≥ t > tˆ. We will prove that we can change the penalty
structure by lowering lL
tˆ
and raising some subsequent lLs for s ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL} in a way that keeps type
L’s incentives for effort unchanged, and yet increase the value of the objective function (RP2).
Claim: There exists t˜ ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL} such that (ICLa ) at t˜ is slack and lLt˜ < l
L
t˜ .
Proof : Suppose not, then for each TL ≥ t > tˆ, either lLt = lLt , or lLt < lLt and (ICLa ) binds. Then since
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whenever lLt < l
L
t , (ICLa ) binds by supposition, it must be that in all t > tˆ, (ICLa ) binds (this follows from
Step 4). But then (ICLa ) at tˆ is violated since lLtˆ > l
L
tˆ . ‖




t and for any t ∈
{
tˆ+ 1, ..., t
}
, (ICLa ) at t is
slack. In particular, we can take t to be the first such period after tˆ.
Proof : Fix t˜ in the previous claim. Note that (ICLa ) at tˆ + 1 must be slack because otherwise (ICLa )




tˆ and Step 4. There are two cases. (1) lLtˆ+1 < l
L





tˆ+1 — in this case, since (ICLa ) is slack at tˆ + 1, it must be that (ICLa ) at tˆ + 2 is slack (otherwise,














, and we are sure that (ICLa ) is slack in all periods of this process before reaching t˜. ‖




tˆ and slightly increase lLt < l
L
t and mean-
while keep the incentives for effort of type L satisfied for all periods. We know that we do not violate
(ICLa ) for t ∈
{
tˆ+ 1, ..., t
}
because (ICLa ) is slack there; plainly, incentives are not affected after t. We shall
show that the modification strictly reduces type H’s rent and meanwhile does not violate (ICLa ) at tˆ nor
any previous period. Therefore, the modified contract strictly dominates the original contract.
We first want to guarantee that (ICLa ) at tˆ is unchanged. By the same reasoning as used in Step 3,
the incentive constraint for effort in period tˆ (given that the agent will work in all subsequent periods no








1− λL)t−(tˆ+1) [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.17)
Observe that if we reduce lL
tˆ







left-hand side of (B.17) does not change. Moreover, it follows that incentives for effort at t < tˆ are also
unchanged (see Step 3), and the incentive condition at t will be satisfied if ∆ is small enough because the
original (ICLa ) at t is slack.
We now show that the modification above leads to a reduction of the rent of type H in (RP2), i.e.











1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 .
Hence, the change in the rent from reducing lL
tˆ










1− λH)tˆ − (1− λL)tˆ]+ 1
(1− λL)t−tˆ
[(







1− λH)t−tˆ − (1− λL)t−tˆ] < 0,
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where the inequality is because t > tˆ and 1− λH < 1− λL.
Step 5b: By Step 5a, we can restrict attention to penalty sequences lL such that lLt ≤ lLt for all
t ≤ TL. Now we show that unless lL(·) = lL(·), the value of the objective (RP2) can be improved while










1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1] .
By Step 4a, (ICLa ) is satisfied in all periods t = 1, . . . , TL whenever lLt = l
L
t . Now, if lLt < l
L
t for any
period, we can replace lLt by l
L
t without affecting the effort incentives for type L, and by doing this we
reduce the rent of type H , thereby raising the value of (RP2).
B.6 Step 6: Under-experimentation by the low type
By Step 5, an optimal contract for the low type that solves program [RP2] can be found by optimizing
over TL, i.e. the length of connected clawback contracts with the penalty structure lL(TL). In this step,
we first argue that the optimal length is no larger than tL (recall that tL is the first-best stopping time),
and then establish generic uniqueness of the optimal contract for the low type.























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 , (B.18)





























If z = 0, the expression above corresponds to surplus maximization; if z = 1, the expression corresponds


















1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1] .
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IfK(·) is shown to be increasing, then Π(z, TL) has decreasing differences, which implies that the optimal
TL when z = 0 is no smaller than the optimal TL when z = 1, as desired. To see that K(·) is indeed
increasing, observe that





t (T + 1)
[(
















1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
= δT
[















1− λH)T+1 − (1− λL)T+1]
−δT+1c
[(



















1− λH)T > 0,
where the second equality uses the definition of lL(·) and the final inequality is because βLTλL < 1.
It is also clear that there is generically a unique TL that maximizes Π(1, TL); hereafter we denote
this solution tL. In the non-generic cases where multiple maximizers exist, we select the largest one.
Step 6b: We have shown so far that among connected clawback contracts, there is generically a
unique contract for type L that solves [RP2] (or, more precisely, the portion of the program involving
the low type’s contract). We now claim that there generically cannot be any other clawback contract for
type L that solves [RP2]. Suppose, to contradiction, that this is false: there is an optimal non-connected
clawback contract CL = (ΓL,WL0 , l
L) in which 1 ∈ αL(CL). Let t◦ < max ΓL be the earliest lockout
period in CL. Without loss, owing to genericity, we take δ < 1. Following the arguments of Step 3, in
particular Remark 3, the optimality of CL implies that there are two connected clawback contracts that
are also optimal: ĈL = (T̂L, ŴL0 , l̂
L) obtained from CL by applying Modification 1 of Step 3 as many
times as needed to eliminate all lockout periods, and C˜L = (T˜L, W˜L0 , l˜
L) obtained from CL by applying
Modification 2 of Step 3 to shorten the contract by just eliminating all periods from t◦ on. Note that the
modifications ensure that 1 ∈ αL(ĈL) and 1 ∈ αL(C˜L). But now, the fact that T̂L > T˜L contradicts the
generic uniqueness of connected clawback contracts for the low type that solve [RP2].
Remark 4. Now consider any low-type contract and prescribed action profile that is optimal with regards
to the principal’s original program defined at the outset of Subsection 4.1. By Proposition 1 and Step 1
of the current proof, there is a corresponding (possibly non-connected) clawback contract that solves the
relevant portion of [RP2] and has the low type working in all the same periods. The arguments above
then show that, generically, the original solution must have prescribed the low type to work in periods
1, . . . , t
L. This explains Theorem 2.
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B.7 Step 7: Back to the original program
We have shown so far that there is a solution to program [RP2] in which the low type’s contract is a
connected clawback contract of length tL ≤ tL and in which the penalty sequence is given by lL(tL).
In terms of optimizing over the high type’s contract, note that any solution must induce the high type
to work in each period up to tH and no longer: this follows from the fact that the objective in (RP2)
involving the high type’s contract is social surplus from the high type, and that there is clearly a sequence
of (sufficiently low) penalties lH to ensure that (ICHa ) is satisfied.
Recall that solutions to [RP2] produce solutions to [RP1] by choosing WL0 to make (IR
L) bind and
WH0 to make (Weak-IC





connected clawback contract where WL0 is set to make (IRL) bind, and consider the solutions to program
[RP1] in which the low type’s contract is CL. We will argue that some of these solutions to [RP1], namely
C
L combined with a suitable onetime-clawback contract for the high type, also solve the original program
[P]. Recall that [RP1] differs from [P] in three ways:
1. it imposes (Weak-ICHL) rather than (ICHL);
2. it ignores (IRH );
3. it ignores (ICLH ).
We address each of these constraints in order.
Step 7a: First, we argue that given any connected clawback contract of length TL ≤ tL with
penalty sequence lL(TL), it would be optimal for type H to work in every period 1 . . . , TL, no matter the
history of prior effort. Consequently, any solution to [RP1] using CL satisfies (ICHL).
To prove the claim, we fix any TL ≤ tL and write lL as shorthand for lL(TL). The argument is by
induction. Consider first the last period, TL. Since
−βLTLλLlLTL = c,
it follows from the fact that tH > tL (hence βHt λH > β
L
t λ





i.e., regardless of the history, type H will work in period TL.
Now assume inductively that it is optimal for type H to work in period t+ 1 ≤ TL no matter the















1− λH)s−(t+2) [(1− λH) lLs − c] ≤ − cβHt+1λH − lLt+1. (B.19)
Therefore, at period t < TL:
−βHt λH




























1− λH) βHt c
βHt+1
= −βHt λH lLt + δc
≥ −βLt λLlLt + δc
= c,
where the first inequality uses (B.19), the second equality uses βHt+1 =
βHt (1−λH)
1−βHt +βHt (1−λH)
, and the final equal-



























































where the inequality follows from the fact that for all t ∈ {1, . . . , tL}, lLt ≤ 0.














≥ 0 (by (IRL)),
and hence (IRH ) is satisfied.
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Step 7c: Finally, we show that there is a solution to [RP1] usingCL that also satisfies (ICLH ) in [P],
which completes the proof. As previously noted, any optimal contract for the high type in [RP1] must
induce effort from this type in periods 1, . . . , tH and make (Weak-ICHL) bind. We will construct such
a onetime-clawback contract, CH = (tH ,WH0 , l
H
tH
), where given the penalty lH
tH
(a free parameter at this
point) and that the high type works in all periods, WH0 is chosen to make (Weak-IC
HL) bind, i.e. by the
equation:
[(




1− λH)t−1 c− (1− β0) tH∑
t=1
















1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
is the rent earned by type H given type L’s contract CL.
Plainly, the penalty lH
tH
can be chosen to be severe enough (i.e. sufficiently negative) to ensure that
it is optimal for an agent of either type, H or L, to work in all periods after accepting such a contract CH ,
i.e. that for all θ ∈ {L,H}, αθ(CH) = 1. All that remains is to show that a sufficiently severe lH
tH
and its
corresponding WH0 (determined by (B.21)) also satisfy (IC
LH ) given that αL(CH) = 1.










1− λL)t−1 + (1− β0) tH∑
t=1
δt

















1− λL)t−1 + (1− β0) tH∑
t=1
δt




1− λL)tH − (1− λH)tH] lHtH + k, (B.22)







1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]} is independent of lH
tH
.
The expression (B.22) is an affine function of lH
tH
, with a strictly positive coefficient on lH
tH
, since
λH > λL. Hence, we can choose lH
tH
sufficiently low so that (B.22) is negative, in which case (ICLH ) is




C Proof of Proposition 2
We use a similar monotone comparative statics argument as that employed in Step 6 of the proof of
Theorem 3. Recall expression (B.18), which was the portion of the principal’s objective that involves a
stopping time for the low type, T :























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]} ,
where lLt (T ) is given by (6) in Theorem 3. The second-best stopping time, t
L, is the T that maximizes
V (T, ·).40 To establish the comparative statics of tL with respect to the parameters, we show that V (T, ·)
has increasing or decreasing differences in T and the relevant parameter.
Substituting lLt (T ) from (6) into V (·) above yields



































1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]

. (C.1)
After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain












1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 . (C.2)
(C.2) implies that V (T, β0, µ0, c, δ) has increasing differences in (T, β0), because
∂
∂β0
[V (T + 1, β0, ·)− V (T, β0, ·)] = δT+1
 (1− µ0)
[(





1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 > 0.
It thus follows that tL is increasing in β0. Similarly, (C.2) also implies
∂
∂c
[V (T + 1, c, ·)− V (T, c, ·)] = δT+1











1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 < 0,
40While the maximizer is generically unique, recall that if multiple maximizers exist we select the largest one.
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and hence tL is decreasing in c.
Finally, consider the comparative static with respect to µ0. From (C.2), we obtain
∂
∂µ0












1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 . (C.3)




λL ≥ c, which is equivalent to
β0
(
1− λL)tL−1 (λL − c)− (1− β0) c ≥ 0. Thus, for T + 1 ≤ tL,
β0
(
1− λL)T (λL − c)− (1− β0) c ≥ 0. (C.4)
Combining (C.3) and (C.4) implies
∂
∂µ0
[V (T + 1, β0, µ0, c, δ)− V (T, β0, µ0, c, δ)] ≤ −δT+1c
β0
(
1− λL)T + 1− β0
(1− λL)T λL
(
1− λH)T (λH − λL) < 0.
It follows that tL is decreasing in µ0.
D Proof of Theorem 5
We assume throughout this appendix that δ = 1. Without loss of generality by Proposition 1, we focus
on menus of clawback contracts. In this appendix, we will introduce programs and constraints that have
analogies with those used in Appendix B for the case of tH > tL. Accordingly, we often use the same
labels for equations as before, but the reader should bear in mind that all references in this appendix to
such equations are to those defined in this appendix.
Outline. Since this is a long proof, let us describe the pieces involved. We begin by showing in Step 1 that
it is without loss to focus on contracts for type L that induce him to work in every non-lockout period;
this is identical to the first step in the proof of Theorem 3. In Step 2, we relax the principal’s program
[P] (which already takes into account Step 1) into a relaxed program, [RP1], that ignores the high type’s
participation constraint, (IRH ), and the low type’s self-selection constraint, (ICLH ), and show that the
resulting program can be further simplified into a program called [RP2] whose only constraints are the
dynamic moral hazard constraints (ICHa ) and (ICLa ). A critical difference here relative to the analogous
relaxed program in the proof of Theorem 3 is that the current program [RP2] does not constrain what the
high type must do when taking the low type’s contract.
Focusing thereafter on [RP2], we show in Step 3 that there is an optimal clawback contract for type
L that is connected. In Step 4, we develop three lemmas pertaining to properties of the set αH(CL) in any
CL that is an optimal contract for type L. We then use these lemmas in Step 5 to show that in solving
[RP2], we can restrict attention to connected clawback contractsCL for type L such that αH(CL) includes
a stopping strategy with the most work property, i.e., an action plan that involves consecutive work for some
number of periods followed by shirking thereafter, and where the number of work periods is larger than
in any action plan in αH(CL). Building on the restriction to stopping strategies, we then show in Step 6
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that there is always an optimal contract for type L that is a onetime-clawback contract.
For an arbitrary time TL, Step 7 first defines a particular last-period penalty lL
TL
(TL) and an asso-
ciated time THL(TL) ≤ TL, and then establishes that if TL is the optimal length of experimentation for
type L, there is an optimal onetime-clawback contract for type L with penalty lL
TL
(TL) and in which type
H’s most-work optimal stopping strategy involves THL(TL) periods of work. Hence, using lL
TL
(TL) and
THL(TL), an optimal contract for type L that solves [RP2] can be found by optimizing over the length
TL. In Step 8, we show that the optimal length, tL, is no larger than the first-best stopping time, tL. Fi-
nally, in Step 9, we show that there is a solution to [RP2] that combines type L’s contract with a suitable
onetime-clawback contract for type H and also solves the original program [P].
D.1 Step 1: Low type always works





, we claim that there is a contract ĈL =
(




(i) 1 ∈ αL(ĈL);
(ii) UL0 (C
L,αL(CL)) = UL0 (Ĉ
L,1);
(iii) ΠL0 (C
L,αL(CL)) = ΠL0 (Ĉ
L,1); and
(iv) UH0 (C
L,αH(CL)) ≥ UH0 (ĈL,αH(ĈL)).
The proof is identical to Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3 and thus omitted.
D.2 Step 2: Simplifying the program
By Step 1, we can restrict our attention to clawback contracts Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , l
θ), with type L’s contract
inducing type L to exert effort in all periods in ΓL. Denoting the set of clawback contracts by C, the















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )
















) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH (CL)) . (ICHL)
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To solve program [P], we solve a relaxed program and later verify that the solution is feasible in
















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )








) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH (CL)) . (ICHL)
It is clear that in any solution to program [RP1], (IRL) must be binding: otherwise, the initial time-
zero transfer from the principal to the agent in the contract CL can be reduced slightly to strictly improve
the second term of the objective function while not violating any of the constraints. Similarly, (ICHL) must
also bind because otherwise the time-zero transfer in the contract CH can be reduced to improve the first
term of the objective function without violating any of the constraints.
Using these two binding constraints, substituting in the formulae from equations (1) and (2), and
letting the principal select which optimal action plan the high type should use when taking the low type’s
contract (aHL ∈ αH(CL)), we can rewrite the objective function (RP1) as the expected total surplus less

































































































 , (ICLa )
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 . (ICHa )
Program [RP2] is separable, i.e. it can be solved by separately maximizing (RP2) with respect to
(CL,aHL) subject to (ICLa ) and separately maximizing (RP2) with respect to (CH ,aH) subject to (ICHa ).




. Note that given any action plan a that

















whenever a, â ∈ αH (CL) .
It will be convenient at various places to consider the difference in information rents under con-










)− UH0 (CL,a))− (UL0 (ĈL,1)− UL0 (CL,1)) . (D.1)

















D.3 Step 3: Connected contracts for the low type
We now claim that in program [RP2], it is without loss to consider solutions in which the low type’s
contract is a connected clawback contract, i.e. solutions CL in which ΓL =
{
1, . . . , TL
}
for some TL.
To avoid trivialities, consider any optimal CL with ΓL 6= ∅. Let t◦ be the earliest lockout period in
ΓL, i.e. t◦ = min{t : t /∈ ΓL}. Consider a modified clawback contract ĈL that removes the lockout period
t◦ and shortens the contract by one period as follows:
Γ̂L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1} ∪ {s : s ≥ t◦ and s+ 1 ∈ ΓL},
l̂Ls =
{
lLs if s ≤ t◦ − 1,




Given no discounting, it is straightforward that it remains optimal for type L to work in every period in
Γ̂L, and given any optimal action plan for type H under the original contract, aHL ∈ αH(CL), the action
plan
âHL = (âHLs )s∈Γ̂L =
{
aHLs if s ≤ t◦ − 1,
aHLs+1 if s ≥ t◦ and s ∈ Γ̂L,
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is optimal for type H under the modified contract, i.e. âHL ∈ αH(ĈL). Given no discounting, it is also
immediate that the surplus generated by type L is unchanged by the modification. It thus follows that the
value of (RP2) is unchanged by the modification. This procedure can be applied iteratively to all lockout
periods to produce a connected contract.
D.4 Step 4: Optimal deviation action plans for the high type
By the previous steps, we can restrict our attention to connected clawback contracts CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L)
that induce effort from the low type in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}. We now describe properties of an
optimal connected clawback contract for the low type (Step 4a) and an optimal action plan for the high
type when taking the low type’s contract (Step 4b).
Step 4a: Consider an optimal connected clawback contract for type L, CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L). The
next two lemmas describe properties of such a contract.
Lemma 1. Suppose that CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) is an optimal contract for type L. Then for any t = 1, . . . , TL, there
exists an optimal action plan a ∈ αH (CL) such that at = 1.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for some τ ∈ {1, . . . , TL} , aτ = 0 for all a ∈ αH (CL). For any ε > 0,
define a contractCL (ε) = (TL,WL0 , l
L(ε)) modified fromCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) as follows: (i) lLτ (ε) = lLτ −ε;
(ii) lLτ−1 (ε) = lLτ−1 + ε
(
1− λL); and (iii) lLt (ε) = lLt if t /∈ {τ − 1, τ}. We derive a contradiction by showing
that for small enough ε > 0, CL (ε) together with an original optimal contract for type H , CH , is feasible




satisfy (ICLa ) and
(ICHa ). To evaluate how the objective changes when CL (ε) is used instead of CL, we thus only need to




We first claim that αH
(
CL (ε)
) ⊆ αH (CL) when ε is small enough. To see this, fix any a ∈









+ η for any a′ /∈ αH (CL) . Since UH0 (CL (ε) ,a′) is continuous in ε, it










Thus, a′ /∈ αH (CL(ε)). It follows that αH (CL (ε)) ⊆ αH (CL).

























Hence, CL (ε) strictly improves the objective relative to CL. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Suppose that CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) is an optimal contract for type L and there is some τ ∈ {1, . . . , TL}




. Then (ICLa ) binds at τ.
Proof. Recall from (ICLa ) that aL = 1. Suppose to the contrary that (ICLa ) is not binding at some τ but




. For any ε > 0, define a contract CL (ε) = (TL,WL0 , l
L(ε)) modified from
CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) as follows: (i) lLτ (ε) = lLτ + ε; (ii) lLτ−1 (ε) = lLτ−1 − ε
(
1− λL); and (iii) lLt (ε) = lLt if
t /∈ {τ − 1, τ}. We derive a contradiction by showing that for small enough ε > 0, CL (ε) together with
an original optimal contract for type H , CH , is feasible in [RP2] and strictly improves the objective. Note
that by construction (ICLa ) is still satisfied under CL (ε) at t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, τ + 1, . . . , TL. Moreover, since
(ICLa ) is slack at τ under contract CL, it continues to be slack at τ under CL(ε) for ε small enough.
Now for small enough ε, take any a ∈ αH (CL(ε)) ⊆ αH (CL), where the subset inequality






















) [− (1− λL)+ (1− λH)]}






Hence, CL(ε) strictly improves the objective relative to CL. Q.E.D.
Step 4b: For any optimal action plan for the high type under the low type’s contract a ∈ αH (CL)
and s < t, define





1− λH)∑τn=s+1 an .
The next lemma describes properties of any action plan a ∈ αH (CL).
Lemma 3. Suppose a ∈ αH (CL) and s < t.
(1) If D (s, t,a) > 0 and as = 1, then at = 1.
(2) If D (s, t,a) < 0 and as = 0, then at = 0.
(3) If D (s, t,a) = 0, then a′ ∈ αH (CL) where a′s = at, a′t = as, and a′τ = aτ if τ 6= s, t.
Proof. Consider the first case of D (s, t,a) > 0. Suppose to the contrary that for some optimal action plan
a and two periods s < t, we have D (s, t,a) > 0 and as = 1 but at = 0. Consider an action plan a′ such
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that a′ and a agree except that a′s = 0 and a′t = 1. That is,
a = (· · · , 1︸︷︷︸
period s
, · · · , 0︸︷︷︸
period t
, · · · ),
a′ = (· · · , 0︸︷︷︸
period s
, · · · , 1︸︷︷︸
period t









)− UHs (CL,a′) = −βHs λH∑t−1τ=s lLτ (1− λH)∑τn=s+1 an = −βHs λHD (s, t,a) .
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Since action plans a and a′ have the same number of
working periods, the assumption of no discounting implies that neither the effort costs nor the penalty
sequence matters for the difference in utilities conditional on the bad state. Conditional on the good state,
the effort costs again do not affect the difference in utilities; however, the probability with which the agent




)−UHs (CL,a′) < 0 if D (s, t,a) > 0. But this contradicts the assumption that
a is optimal; hence, the claim in part (1) follows. The proof of part (2) is analogous.




)− UHs (CL,a′) = 0; hence, both a and a′ are optimal. The case of as = 0 and
at = 1 is analogous. Q.E.D.
D.5 Step 5: Stopping strategies for the high type
We use the following concepts to characterize the solution to [RP2]:
Definition 4. An action plan a is a stopping strategy (that stops at t) if there exists t ≥ 1 such that as = 1
for s ≤ t and as = 0 for s > t.
Definition 5. An optimal action plan for type θ under contract C, a ∈ αθ(C), has the most-work prop-
erty (or is a most-work optimal strategy) if no other optimal action plan under the contract has more work
periods; that is, for all a′ ∈ αθ(C), # {n : an = 1} ≥ # {n : a′n = 1}.
Step 4 described properties of optimal contracts for the low type and optimal action plans for the
high type under the low type’s contract. We now use these properties to show that in solving program
[RP2], we can restrict attention to connected clawback contracts for the low type CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) such
that there is an optimal action plan for the high type under the contract a ∈ αH(CL) that is a stopping
strategy with the most work property.
Let N = mina∈αH(CL) # {n : an = 0} . That is, among all action plans that are optimal for type H
under contract CL, the action plan in which type H works the largest number of periods involves type




a ∈ AN : at = 0 for all t > TL − k
}
,
i.e. any a ∈ AN,k contains a total of N shirking periods, (at least) k of which are in the tail.
57
Our goal is to establish the following:
for any k < N : AN,k 6= ∅ =⇒
N⋃
n=k+1
AN,n 6= ∅. (D.3)
In other words, wheneverAN contains an action plan that has k < N shirks in the tail,AN must contain an
action plan that has at least k+1 shirks in the tail. By induction, this impliesAN,N 6= ∅, which is equivalent
to the existence of an optimal action plan that is a stopping strategy with the most work property.
Suppose to contradiction that (D.3) is not true; i.e. there is some k < N such that AN,k 6= ∅ and yet⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then there exists
tˆ = min
{
t : a ∈ AN,k, at = 0, t < TL − k, as = 1 for each s = t+ 1, . . . , TL − k
}
. (D.4)
In words, tˆ is the smallest shirking period preceding a working period such that there is an optimal action
plan a ∈ AN,k with k+ 1 shirking periods from (including) tˆ. Now take tˆ0 = tˆ. For n = 0, 1, . . . , whenever{
t : at = 0,a ∈ AN,k, t < tˆn
} 6= ∅, define
tˆn+1 = min
{







uniquely pins down an action profile â ∈ AN,k. In words, among all effort profiles in
AN,k, â has the earliest n-th shirk for each n = 1, ..., N. Note that â takes the following form:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 0 · · ·
We will prove that
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n 6= ∅ (contradicting the hypothesis above) by showing that we can “move”
the shirking in period tˆ of â to the end. This is done via three lemmas.
Lemma 4. Suppose AN,k 6= ∅ and
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then lLt = 0 for any t = tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1.
Proof. We proceed by induction. Take any t ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1} and assume that lLs = 0 for
s = t+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1. We show that lLt = 0.
Step 1: lLt ≥ 0.
Proof of Step 1: Suppose not, i.e., lLt < 0. Then the fact that (ICLa ) is satisfied at period t+ 1 and the
hypothesis that lLt < 0 imply that (ICLa ) is slack at period t.41 Hence, by Lemma 2, there exists an action





s < 0 for m ∈ {t, . . . , TL − k − 1}. By Lemma 3, part (2), a′s = 0 for any
s = t, . . . , TL − k. Thus, a′ ∈ αH (CL) is as follows:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 0 · · · 0 0
Claim 1: There exists s∗ > TL − k such that a′s∗ = 1.
41This can be proved along very similar lines to part (2) of Lemma 3.
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Proof : Suppose not. Then a′s = 0 for all s ≥ TL − k (recall a′TL−k = 0). We claim this implies
# {n : a′n = 0} > N . To see this, note that # {n : a′n = 0} ≥ N by assumption. If # {n : a′n = 0} = N, then
a′ ∈ AN , and since a′ contains k + 1 shirking periods in its tail, it follows that a′ ∈ AN,k+1, contradicting
the assumption that
⋃N




TL−k(â) and taking a
′
TL−k = 1 is optimal, a contradiction. ‖
Now let s∗ be the first such working period after TL − k. Then,
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · · s∗ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 · · ·
a′: 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 1




s = 0. Now applying part (3)
of Lemma 3, we obtain that the agent is indifferent between a′ and a′′ where a′′ differs from a′ only
by switching the actions in period TL − k and period s∗. But since ∑TL−k−1s=t lLs < 0, the optimality of
a′′t = 0, a′′TL−k = 1 contradicts part (2) of Lemma 3.
Step 2: lLt ≤ 0.
Proof of Step 2: Assume to the contrary that lLt > 0. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1: lL
TL−k ≥ 0.






1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0.
Therefore, by part (1) of Lemma 3, âTL−k+1 = 1. But this contradicts the definition of â.
Case 2: lL
TL−k < 0.
In this case, (ICLa ) must be slack in period TL − k (since it is satisfied in the next period and
lL
TL−k < 0). Hence by Lemma 2, there exists a˜ such that a˜TL−k = 0.
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · ·
a˜: 0
Claim 2: a˜s = 0 for any s > TL − k.
Proof : Suppose the claim is not true. Then define
τ = min
{
s : s > TL − k and a˜s = 1
}
.
This is shown in the following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 · · · 0 1
Applying parts (1) and (2) of Lemma 3 to â and a˜ respectively, we obtain∑τ−1
s=TL−k l
L
s = 0. (D.6)
59




1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0. (D.7)






1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0.
Now applying part (1) of Lemma 3 to â, we reach the conclusion that âτ = 1, a contradiction. ‖
Hence, we have established the claim that a˜s = 0 for all s > TL − k, as depicted below:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
Claim 3: # {n : a˜n = 0} = N + 1 and βHTL−k (a˜) = βHTL−k (â) .
Proof : By definition ofN,# {n : a˜n = 0} ≥ N. If # {n : a˜n = 0} = N, then a˜ contains k+1 shirking
periods in its tail, contradicting the assumption thatAN,k+1 = ∅. Moreover, if # {n : a˜n = 0} > N+1, then
βH
TL−k (a˜) > β
H
TL−k (â) . But then since âTL−k = 1, we should have a˜TL−k = 1, a contradiction. Therefore,
it must be # {n : a˜n = 0} = N + 1. ‖
By Claim 3, we can choose a˜ such that a˜ differs from â only in period TL − k. This is shown in the
following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·




1− λH)∑sn=t+1 a˜n > 0.
Applying part (1) of Lemma 3, we must conclude that a˜TL−k = 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. Suppose AN,k 6= ∅ and
⋃N
m=k+1AN,m = ∅. Then lLtˆ = 0.
Proof. Step 1: lL
tˆ
≥ 0.
Proof of Step 1: Suppose to the contrary that lL
tˆ





1− λH)∑sn=tˆ+1 ân < 0.




Proof of Step 2: Suppose to the contrary that lL
tˆ
> 0. Note that by Lemma 1, there exists an action
plan a′ ∈ αH (CL) such that a′
tˆ
= 1. Then since, by Lemma 4, lLt = 0 for t = tˆ+1, . . . , TL−k−1, it follows
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from part (1) of Lemma 3 that a′s = 1 for s = tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k. Hence, we obtain the following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 1 1 · · · 1 1
Claim: there exists t˜ < tˆ, such that a′
t˜
= 0 and ât˜ = 1.
Proof : since # {t : a′t = 0} ≥ N = # {t : ât = 0}, a′tˆ = 1, âtˆ = 0, and ât = 0 for all t > TL − k, we
have #
{




t : ât = 0, t < tˆ
}
. The claim follows immediately.
We can take t˜ to be the largest period that satisfies the above claim. Hence â and a′ are as follows:
period: t˜ · · · tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 1 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 1 · · · 1 1
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: ât = a′t for each t = t˜+ 1, . . . , tˆ− 1.





1− λH)∑sn=t˜+1 ân = 0 and the agent is indifferent between â and
â′ where â′ differs from â only in that the actions at periods t˜ and tˆ are switched. But this contradicts the
definition of tˆ (see (D.4)).
Case 2: âm = 0 and a′m = 1 for some m ∈
{
t˜+ 1, . . . , tˆ− 1} .
First note that Case 1 and Case 2 are exhaustive because t˜ is taken to be the largest period t < tˆ
such that ât = 1 and a′t = 0. Without loss, we take m to be the smallest possible. Hence ât = a′t for each
t = t˜+ 1, . . . ,m− 1. Then â and a′ are as follows:
period: t˜ · · · m · · · tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 1 0 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 1 1 · · · 1 1
But again, by Lemma 3, we can switch the actions at periods t˜ and m in â, contradicting the definition of
â (see (D.5)).
The proof of Step 2 is therefore complete. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6. If AN,k 6= ∅ then
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then lLt = 0 for t = tˆ, . . . , TL − k − 1, by Lemma 4
and Lemma 5. Therefore, by part (3) of Lemma 3, we can switch âtˆ with âTL−k to obtain â
′. However, since
# {t : â′t = 0} = # {t : ât = 0} = N, it follows immediately that â′ ∈ AN . Since â′t = 0 for all t > TL−k−1,
â′ ∈ ⋃Nn=k+1AN,n. Q.E.D.
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D.6 Step 6: Onetime-clawback contracts for the low type
In Step 5, we showed that we can restrict attention in solving program [RP2] to connected clawback
contracts for the low type CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) such that there is an optimal action plan for the high type
a ∈ αH(CL) that is a stopping strategy with the most work property. We now use this result to show that




This result is proved via two lemmas.
Lemma 7. Let CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) be an optimal contract for the low type with a most-work optimal stopping
strategy for the high type â that stops at tˆ, i.e. tˆ = max{t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} : ât = 1}. For each t > tˆ, there is an
optimal action plan, a˜ ∈ αH(CL), such that for any s, âs = a˜s ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t}.
Proof. Step 1: First, we show that the Lemma’s claim is true for some t > tˆ (rather than for all t > tˆ).
Suppose not, to contradiction. Then Lemma 3 implies that
for any n ∈ {tˆ, tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − 1},
n∑
s=tˆ
lLs < 0. (D.8)
Hence, (ICLa ) is slack at tˆ (since it is satisfied in the next period and lLtˆ < 0) and, by Lemma 2, there exists
an optimal action plan, a′′, with a′′
tˆ
= 0.
Claim 1: a′′s = 0 for all s > tˆ.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that there exists τ > tˆ such that a′′τ = 1. Take the smallest such τ .
Then it follows from Lemma 3 applied to â and a′′ that
τ−1∑
s=tˆ
lLs = 0, contradicting (D.8). ‖
Hence, we obtain that a′′s = 0 for all s ≥ tˆ, and it follows from the optimality of âtˆ = 1 and a′′tˆ = 0
that a′′ is a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ− 1:
period: · · · tˆ− 2 tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 tˆ+ 2 · · ·
â: · · · 1 1 1 0 0 · · ·
a′′: · · · 1 1 0 0 0 · · ·






Proof: Suppose to contradiction that a′
tˆ
= 0. Then by (D.8) and Lemma 3, a′
tˆ+1
= 0. But then
again by (D.8) and Lemma 3, a′
tˆ+2






= 1 and a′
tˆ
= 1, by the most work property of â, there must exist a period m < tˆ such
that a′m = 0. Take the largest such period:
period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 tˆ+ 2 · · · TL
â: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 0 · · · 0
a′′: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
a′: 0 1 · · · 1 1 1
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1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, there exists an optimal






= 1, (D.8), and Lemma 3.
Step 2: We now prove the Lemma’s claim for tˆ + 1. That is, we show that there exists an optimal
action plan, call it âtˆ+1, such that for any s, âtˆ+1s = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, tˆ+ 1}. Suppose, to contradiction, that
the claim is false. Then, by Lemma 3, lL
tˆ
< 0. Using Step 1, there is some τ > tˆ that satisfies the Lemma’s
claim; let aτ be the corresponding optimal action plan (which is identical to â in exactly all periods except
from tˆ and τ ). Since by Lemma 1 there exists an optimal action plan, call it a′, with a′
tˆ+1
= 1, Lemma 3 and
lL
tˆ
< 0 imply a′
tˆ
= 1. By the most work property of â, there must exist a period m < tˆ such that a′m = 0.
Take the largest such period:
period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · τ τ + 1 · · ·
â: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
aτ : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 · · · 1 1 1





1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, there exists an optimal








< 0, and Lemma 3.
Step 3: Finally, we use induction to prove that the Lemma’s claim is true for any s > tˆ + 1. (Note
the claim is true for tˆ + 1 by Step 2.) Take any t + 1 ∈ {tˆ + 2, . . . , TL}. Assume the claim is true for
s = tˆ+ 2, . . . , t. We show that the claim is true for t+ 1.
By Step 2 and the induction hypothesis, there exists an optimal action plan, ât, such that for any
s, âts = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t}. We shall show that there exists an optimal action plan, ât+1, such that for any
s, ât+1s = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t + 1}. Suppose, to contradiction, that the claim is false. Note that Step 2, the
induction hypothesis, and Lemma 3 imply lLs = 0 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t−1. It thus follows from Lemma 3 and
the claim being false that lLt < 0. By Lemma 1 there exists an optimal action plan, call it a′, with a′t+1 = 1.
Then Lemma 3 and lLt < 0 imply that a′t = 1.
Claim 3: a′s = 1 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t− 1.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that a′s∗ = 0 for some s∗ ∈ {tˆ, . . . , t − 1}. Then since lLs = 0 for all
s = tˆ, . . . , t − 1, by Lemma 3, there exists an optimal action plan, a′′, obtained from a′ by switching a′s∗
and a′t. But then the optimality of a′′ contradicts a′′t = 0, a′′t+1 = 1, lLt < 0, and Lemma 3. ‖
Hence, we obtain a′s = 1 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t + 1, and by the most work property of â, there must
exist a period m < tˆ such that a′m = 0. Take the largest such period:
period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · ·
â : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
ât : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · ·
a′: · · · 0 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1 1
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1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Since lLs = 0 for all s =





1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, by Lemma 3, there exists an optimal action
plan a′′ obtained from a′ by switching a′m and a′t. But then the optimality of a′′ contradicts a′′t = 0,
a′′t+1 = 1, lLt < 0, and Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8. If CL is an optimal contract for the low type with a most-work optimal stopping strategy for the high
type, then CL is a onetime-clawback contract.
Proof. FixCL per the Lemma’s assumptions. Let â and tˆ be as defined in the statement of Lemma 7. Then,
it immediately follows from Lemma 7 and Lemma 3 that lLt = 0 for all t ∈ {tˆ, tˆ + 1, . . . , TL − 1}. We use
induction to prove that lLt = 0 for all t < tˆ.
Assume lLt = 0 for all t ∈ {m+1,m+2, . . . , TL−1} form < tˆ. We will show that lLm = 0. First, lLm >





1− λH)∑sn=m+1 ân > 0 (by Lemma 7 and the inductive assumption),
contradicting the optimality of â and Lemma 3. Second, we claim lLm < 0 is not possible. Suppose, to
contradiction, that lLm < 0. Then (ICLa ) is slack at m and, by Lemma 2, there exists an optimal plan a′





(â), and thus the optimality of â implies that a′ is suboptimal at tˆ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
D.7 Step 7: The optimal penalty in a onetime-clawback contract
By the previous steps, we restrict attention to onetime-clawback contracts for the low type such that
the low type works in all periods t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} and the high type has a most-work optimal stopping
strategy. For an arbitrary such contract CL, let tˆ(CL) denote the high type’s most-work optimal stopping
time, i.e. tˆ(CL) := max{t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} : âs = 1 for all s = 1, . . . , t, â ∈ αH(CL)}. We now show that




tˆ(CL) is given by
THL(TL) := min
{


















When not essential, we suppress the dependence of tˆ(CL) on CL. We proceed by proving five
claims.
Claim 1: Given any onetime-clawback contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
), −βHtˆ+1λH lLTL < c.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that −βHtˆ+1λH lLTL ≥ c. Then type H is willing to work one more
period after having worked for tˆ periods, contradicting the definition of tˆ. ‖
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Claim 2: Given an optimal onetime-clawback contractCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
), (1−λH)tˆ ≤ (1−λL)TL .




work optimal stopping time tˆ is such that (1 − λH)tˆ > (1 − λL)TL . Then for any strategy a˜ ∈ αH(CL)
where type H works for a total of t˜ periods, (1− λH)t˜ > (1− λL)TL . Now note that given CL and a˜, type


























Consider a modification that reduces lL
TL
by ε > 0. By Claim 1, for ε small enough, this modification does
not affect incentives, and by (1−λH)t˜ > (1−λL)TL , the modification strictly reduces typeH’s information
rent. But then CL cannot be optimal. ‖
Claim 3: In any onetime-clawback contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL



























for some t ≤ TL, then tˆ(CL) ≥ t and 1 ∈ αL(CL).














. Then type L is not willing
to work for TL periods; having worked for TL − 1 periods, type L’s incentive compatibility constraint











. Then typeH is not willing to work for tˆ periods; having worked for tˆ−1 periods, type
H is willing to work one more period only if −βLtˆ λH lLTL ≥ c, which is not satisfied with lLTL > − cβHtˆ λL .















. Consider first type L. The
proof is by induction. Consider the last period, TL. Since no matter the history of effort the current belief
is some βL
TL
≥ βLTL , it is immediate that −βLTLλLlLTL ≥ c, and thus it is optimal for type L to work in the
last period. Now assume inductively that it is optimal for type L to work in period t+ 1 ≤ TL no matter
the history of effort, and consider period t with belief βLt . The inductive hypothesis implies that
− βLt+1λL





 ≥ c. (D.10)
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Therefore, at period t:
−βLt λL
−c+ (1− λL)


















Finally, consider type H . By Lemma 3 and the fact that lLt = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , TL − 1, type H is
indifferent between any two action plans a and a′ such that # {t : at = 0} = # {t : a′t = 0}. Thus, without
loss, we restrict attention to stopping strategies, and we only need to show that it is optimal for type H
to stop at s ≥ t. Note that for any s < t, given that type H has worked consecutively until and including
period s, −βHs+1λH lLTL ≥ c, and thus type H does not want to stop at s. ‖


















Proof: Suppose to contradiction that the claim is false. Given an optimal onetime-clawback con-
tract for type L, CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL












1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]+ c TL∑
t=tˆ+1
[




Consider a modification that increases lL
TL
by ε > 0. By Claim 4 being false and Claim 3, for ε small
enough, working in all periods t = 1, . . . , TL remains optimal for type L, and â remains optimal for type
H . But then by Claim 2, type H’s information rent either goes down or remains unchanged with the
modification, and thus there exists an optimal contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
) where the claim is true. ‖
Claim 5: There is an optimal onetime-clawback contractCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
) with tˆ(CL) = THL(TL).
Proof: Take an arbitrary optimal contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
). By Claims 1 and 5, tˆ(CL) sat-
isfies βHtˆ(CL)+1λH < β
L
TLλ
L. By Claim 2, tˆ(CL) satisfies (1 − λH)tˆ(CL) ≤ (1 − λL)TL . Thus, all that
remains to be shown is that there exists CL where tˆ(CL) is the smallest period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} that sat-
isfies these two conditions. Suppose to contradiction that this claim is false. Then tˆ(CL) − 1 also satis-
fies the conditions; that is, βHtˆ(CL)λH < β
L
TLλ
































lows that type H’s incentive constraint in period tˆ(CL) binds; i.e., type H is indifferent between working
and shirking at tˆ(CL) given that he has worked in all periods t = 1, . . . , tˆ(CL) − 1 and will shirk in all
periods t = tˆ(CL)+1, . . . , TL. Hence, both a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ(CL) and a stopping strategy
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that stops at tˆ(CL) − 1 are optimal for type H given CL, and type H’s information rent is the same for











1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]+ c TL∑
t=tˆ(CL)
[




Now consider a modified contract, ĈL, obtained fromCL by increasing lL
TL





















, for ε small enough, 1 ∈ αL(ĈL) and a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ(CL) − 1
remains optimal for type H under ĈL. Then tˆ(ĈL) = tˆ(CL)− 1, and since (1− λH)tˆ(CL)−1 ≤ (1− λL)TL ,
type H’s information rent either goes down or remains unchanged with the modification, so ĈL is opti-
mal. If tˆ(ĈL) = THL(TL), we are done. Otherwise, we can apply the argument to tˆ(ĈL) and repeat until
we eventually arrive at the desired contract CL with tˆ(CL) = THL. ‖
D.8 Step 8: Under-experimentation by the low type
By Step 7, an optimal contract for the low type that solves program [RP2] can be found by optimizing
over TL, i.e. the length of the onetime-clawback contracts with optimal stopping time for the high type
THL(TL) and last period penalty lLTL(TL). We now argue that the optimal length is no larger than the
first-best stopping time, tL.































where we have used the desired stopping time for type H and the desired last-period penalty. Now
































If z = 0, the expression above corresponds to surplus maximization; if z = 1, the expression corresponds
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(1− β0) + β0
(
1− λL)t−1]
IfK(·) is shown to be increasing, then Π(z, TL) has decreasing differences, which implies that the optimal
TL when z = 0 is no smaller than the optimal TL when z = 1, as desired. We show that K(·) is indeed
increasing through the following claims.
Claim 1: THL(T + 1) ∈ {THL(T ), THL(T ) + 1}.
Proof: The fact that THL(T + 1) ≥ THL(T ) follows immediately from the definition of THL(T ). To
show that THL(T + 1) ≤ THL(T ) + 1, note that by the definition of THL(T ), βHTHL(T )+1λH < βLTλL and





















(1− λH)THL(T )+1 = (1− λH)THL(T )(1− λH) ≤ (1− λL)T (1− λL) = (1− λL)T+1.
Hence, by the definition of THL(T ), THL(T ) + 1 ≥ THL(T + 1). ‖
Claim 2: lLT+1(T + 1) ≤ lLT (T ).
Proof: This follows from the definition of lLT (T ) and the fact that THL(T + 1) ≥ THL(T ). ‖











































β0(1− λH)THL(T )−1 + 1− β0
<
β0(1− λL)T
β0(1− λL)T + 1− β0 = β
L
T+1,
which implies (1 − λH)THL(T )−1 < (1 − λL)T . But then since βHTHL(T )λH < βLT+1λL < βLTλL, we have
that THL(T ) − 1 satisfies the two conditions defining THL(T ), namely βHTHL(T )−1+1λH < βLTλL and
(1− λH)THL(T )−1 ≤ (1− λL)T , contradicting the definition of THL(T ) (recall THL(T ) is the smallest pe-
riod satisfying the two conditions). ‖
Claim 4: If THL(T + 1) = THL(T ), then K(T + 1)−K(T ) ≥ 0.
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Proof: Let THL(T + 1) = THL(T ) ≡ THL. Then
K (T + 1)−K (T ) = β0lLT+1(T + 1)
[















T+1(T + 1)− lLT (T )
) [
(1− λH)THL − (1− λL)T
]
+β0λ
L(1− λL)T lLT+1(T + 1) + c
[







T+1(T + 1)− lLT (T )
) [
(1− λH)THL − (1− λL)T
]
≥ 0,
where the last equality follows from Claim 3 and the last inequality follows from (1−λH)THL ≤ (1−λL)T
and Claim 2. ‖
Claim 5: If THL(T + 1) = THL(T ) + 1, then K(T + 1)−K(T ) ≥ 0.
Proof: Assume THL(T + 1) = THL(T ) + 1. Note that by Claim 1 this is the only case that remains
to be shown. We now have:
K (T + 1)−K (T ) = β0lLT+1(T + 1)
[












(1− β0) + β0
(











T (T ) + c
) [
(1− λH)THL(T ) − (1− λL)T
]
. (D.11)
We consider two exhaustive cases.





. Then, substituting into (D.11) and manipulating terms yields
K (T + 1)−K (T ) = β0lLT+1(T + 1)
[



































and (1− λH)THL(T )+1 ≤ (1− λL)T+1, and
the last inequality follows from (1− λH)THL(T )+1 < (1− λH)THL(T )(1− λL).





. Then, substituting into (D.11) and manipulating terms yields
K (T + 1)−K (T ) = β0lLT+1(T + 1)
[


























(1− λH)THL(T )+1 − (1− λL)T (1− λH)
]
> 0,





and (1− λH)THL(T )+1 ≤ (1− λL)T+1,
and the last inequality follows from (1− λL)T+1 > (1− λL)T (1− λH). ‖
The claims above establish that K(·) is indeed increasing, and hence we obtain that TL ≤ tL. Note
also that it is clear that there is generically a unique TL that maximizes Π(1, TL); hereafter we denote this
solution by tL and the associated optimal stopping time for type H by tHL := THL(tL).
D.9 Step 9: Back to the original program
We have shown so far that there is a solution to program [RP2] in which the low type’s contract is a
onetime-clawback contract of length tL ≤ tL and in which the penalty in period tL is given by lLtL(tL).
In terms of optimizing over the high type’s contract, note that any solution must induce the high type
to work in each period up to tH and no longer: this follows from the fact that the objective in (RP2)
involving the high type’s contract is social surplus from the high type, and that there is clearly a sequence
of (sufficiently low) penalties lH to ensure that (ICHa ) is satisfied.
Recall that solutions to [RP2] produce solutions to [RP1] by choosing WL0 to make (IR
L) bind and
WH0 to make (IC






onetime-clawback contract where WL0 is set to make (IRL) bind, and consider the solutions to program
[RP1] in which the low type’s contract is CL. We will argue that some of these solutions to [RP1], namely
C
L combined with a suitable onetime-clawback contract for the high type, also solve the original program
[P]. Recall that [RP1] differs from [P] in two ways: (1) it ignores (IRH ); and (2) it ignores (ICLH ). We
address each of these constraints in order.























where the first inequality follows by definition ofαH(CL) and the second inequality follows from the fact







)) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH(CL)) ≥ UL0 (CL,1) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is by (ICHa ) and (ICHL), the second by (D.12), and the last by (IRL).
Step 9b: Finally, we show that there is a solution to [RP1] usingCL that also satisfies (ICLH ) in [P],
which completes the proof. We can show this by the same argument as the one used in Step 7c of the proof




where given the penalty lH
tH
and that type H works in all periods under this contract, WH0 is chosen to
make (ICHL) bind and the contract is made “risky enough” to deter type L from taking it. We omit the
details since the argument is the same as earlier.
E Details for No Learning
This appendix provides details for the discussion in Subsection 6.2 of the main text. Assume β0 = 1 and
for simplicity that there is some finite time, T , at which the game ends. Since βθt = 1 for all θ ∈ {L,H}




H = λH > β
L
t λ
L = λL for all t. Consequently, the methodology used in proving Theorem 3 can be
applied, with the conclusions that if the optimal length of experimentation for the low type is some T
(constrained to be no larger than T ), the optimal clawback contract for the low type is given by the analog
of (6) with βLt = 1 for all t:
lLt =
{
− (1− δ) c
λL
if t < T,
− c
λL
if t = T,
(E.1)
and the portion of the principal’s payoff that depends on T is given by the analog of (C.1) with the
simplification of β0 = 1:
























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1] .
 .
Hence, for any T ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}we have the following analog of (C.2):




1− λL)T (λL − c)− µ0 c
λL
(
1− λH)T (λH − λL)] .








(1− µ0) (λL − c)λL .
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Since the left-hand side above is strictly increasing in T , it follows that V̂ (T ) is maximized by tL ∈ {0, T}.
Hence, whenever it is optimal to have the low type experiment for any positive amount of time, it is
optimal to have the low type experiment until T , no matter the value of T . Note that whenever exclusion
is optimal (i.e. tL = 0) when β0 = 1, it would also be optimal for all β0 ≤ 1; this follows from the
comparative static of tL with respect to β0 in Proposition 2.
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